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INTRODUCTION
Should directors and officers1 be personally liable in tort for gunshot
wounds sustained by a mall patron after management reduced mall security
in order to maximize profits? Should directors be personally responsible
for failing to install exterior lighting when the failure to do so led to a
resident being robbed and attacked in her condominium unit? Should
directors and officers be liable for negligently managing underwriting risks
or for failing to detect misconduct by employees?
Today, directors and officers can incur personal liability to nonshareholder third parties in all of these and many other instances based on
their inadequate management or failure to supervise corporate affairs and
subordinates.2 Due to the lack of legal protections in this area, corporate
directors and officers face personal liability risks that can substantially
diminish or eliminate their entire personal wealth. For example, in one
case, the president and CEO of a company was held personally liable for
over $132 million for mismanagement.3 Yet, unlike claims that are brought
by shareholders, the law governing tort claims by non-shareholder third
parties against directors and officers remains an area that is largely
neglected by legal scholars.
However, the current approaches to directors’ and officers’ tort liability
for claims involving inadequate supervision and management in the
corporate context are in need of repair. Courts faced with tort-based
supervision and management cases frequently fail to consider that
directors’ and officers’ duties to supervise and manage generally exist only
in relation to the corporation, but not in relation to third parties. In
addition, current approaches neglect the separate corporate personality of
the corporation, unduly shift the risk of doing business to directors and

1. In this Article, the term “officer” means a corporation’s president, chief financial
officer, chief accounting officers, vice presidents of principal business units and any person
with significant policy-making functions. This wording is roughly in line with the definition
of “officer” in Rule 16a-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
2. See infra Part II.
3. Omaha Indem. Co. v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (W.D.
Mo. 1991).
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officers, and undermine the heightened liability protections provided by
corporate law.4
Moreover, the threat of personal liability for directors and officers is also
increasing. On the one hand, courts increasingly rely on a growing body of
statutory law that holds directors and officers liable for acts and omissions
related to supervision and management, even in the absence of any
wrongdoing and solely based on the director’s or officer’s corporate status
and position of authority.5 On the other hand, in most cases plaintiffs will
attempt to hold directors and officers personally liable when the
corporation is insolvent or bankrupt and where the potential individual
defendants are wealthy or covered by liability insurance.6 Because of the
recent financial crisis, scenarios in which corporations are insolvent or
forced into bankruptcy are rising.7 In addition, it is now also possible to
imagine a scenario where an entity that provides directors’ and officers’
liability insurance becomes insolvent or bankrupt, adding to the increased
vulnerability of directors and officers to liability claims.
Typically, cases holding directors and officers liable for supervision and
management failures involve closely held corporations.8 Consequently,
commentators could mistakenly dismiss the issue as largely irrelevant for
directors and officers of large publicly held corporations.
Yet, because the rules to assess tort-based liability do not vary with the
size or type of corporation that is involved,9 directors and officers of public
companies can also face considerable risks of personal liability for
supervision and management. For example, class action litigants in
products liability cases may claim that the board’s or management’s failure
4. The importance of the issues surrounding directors’ and officers’ liability has often
been downplayed due to director and officer (“D&O”) insurance policies or the existence of
indemnification agreements between the individual and the corporation. However,
protection offered by insurance or indemnification—if in place at all—is incomplete. See
infra Part IV.C.
5. See infra Parts I.D., II.B.
6. In this context, it is helpful for plaintiffs that the stay provision of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000), does not generally apply to solvent directors and
officers as co-defendants of a debtor corporation. See, e.g., Oklahoma Federated Gold and
Numismatics, Inc. v. Blodgett, 24 F.3d 136, 141 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that tort claims
against an officer are not subject to the automatic stay).
7. Moreover, plaintiffs can use suits against directors and officers strategically for
their nuisance value and as a tool to exercise added pressure in settlement negotiations.
8. For example, the supervision and management cases cited in Part II of this article
all concern directors and officers of closely held corporations. The size of these
corporations, however, varies widely and range from a small drinking establishment to a
large national food chain.
9. Compare Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996) (applying the
typically used test under Texas law of whether an officer owed an independent duty of
reasonable care to the plaintiff to evaluate claims against the defendant of a closely held
corporation), with McCaskey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 577 (S.D. Tex.
2001) (applying the same test to the defendant Chief Executive Officer of a publicly held
corporation).
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to supervise and manage led to their injuries. In fact, plaintiffs continue to
bring claims against directors and officers in the context of mass torts10 and
products liability.11 A recent example of directors’ and officers’ exposure
in this regard is provided by a wrongful death class action suit filed against
a publicly held manufacturer of a diabetes drug and its directors and
officers.12
Moreover, the current rapid increase in bank failures has also given rise
to tort-based claims against banks’ executives and board members, such as
lawsuits by uninsured depositors alleging negligent management and
oversight.13 With financial markets’ continuing problems, these types of
lawsuits have the potential to evolve into real personal threats to directors
and officers, namely if plaintiffs can convince courts to grant them standing
to bring their claims directly.14
Because of the risks to directors’ and officers’ personal liability for
supervision and management, and the shortcomings with the current
10. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 13
(1986) (noting, however, that payment out of managers’ personal assets is a remote risk).
For example, at one time during the asbestos related class-action lawsuits against JohnsManville, there were approximately 1,000 cases pending with past and present directors,
officers, and employees of Manville named as defendants, most of which involved claims
by Manville employees for failure to warn of potential hazards in the work place. See In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 33 B.R. 254, 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (staying asbestos injury
suits against Johns-Manville managers). Nationwide, the potential damage claims against
directors, officer, and employees at the time of the decision were in excess of $230,000,000.
Id. at 260.
11. See, e.g., In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 624, 634 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (holding that the sole shareholder, director, and officer of a corporate marketer/seller
may be personally liable in toxic-tort products action for consequences of his acts,
regardless of any showing that the defendant was the corporation’s alter ego). However,
courts will be disinclined to allow products liability claims against directors or officers
absent a specific showing of an affirmative direction, sanction, participation, or cooperation
in the production, inspection, maintenance, or sale of a defective product. See Lobato v. Pay
Less Drug Stores, Inc., 261 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1958); Ruzzo v. LaRose Enters., 748
A.2d 261, 270 (R.I. 2000). Conversely, it may suffice to incur liability when an executive
makes or condones false statements about a product. Marsh v. Usk Hardware Co., 132 P.
241, 247–48 (Wash. 1913).
12. See Complaint for Damages at 3, Hoffman v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.,
No. BC410935 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 2009), 2009 WL 890200.
13. See Michael R. Smith & Benjamin Lee, Uninsured-Depositor Litigation: An
Emerging Threat to Directors and Officers of Troubled Banks?, 14 ANDREWS LITIG. REP. 1
(2008).
14. See id. Courts have held that creditors may maintain direct actions against directors
and officers on the basis of mismanagement if they sustained an identifiable loss peculiar
and personal to themselves. However, where misconduct resulted in loss to the corporation
and its creditors generally, the right of action belongs to the corporation and must be
maintained by it or its receiver. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918, 921
(4th Cir. 1973); Finch v. Southside Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 154, 167 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2004); Speer v. Dighton Grain, Inc., 624 P.2d 952, 961 (Kan. 1981). There is also
debate over the existence of the tort of “deepening insolvency,” but that debate is beyond
the scope of this article. For a discussion of the merits of “deepening insolvency” claims
from a Delaware perspective see Trenwick Am. Litig. Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906
A.2d 168, 205–07 (Del. Ch. 2006) (rejecting the doctrine).
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approaches to imposing liability in these cases, this Article argues that the
test for imposing personal liability on directors and officers should be
revised. Under the revised approach, courts should focus strictly on the
nature of the duty and the officer or director’s state of mind. Consequently,
under this revised approach, tort-based personal liability for directors and
officers for breaches of duties owed to the corporation is limited to cases in
which they act fraudulently or with the intention to inflict harm upon third
parties. In addition, directors and officers remain liable for breaches of
duties owed to third parties provided, however, that their conduct was at
least grossly negligent.
Before delving into the revised approach in greater detail, this Article
begins by outlining in Part II the general rules governing directors’ and
officers’ liability vis-à-vis non-shareholder third parties for torts committed
in their official capacities. Part III describes how courts apply these rules
to hold directors and officers liable in tort for failures to supervise and
manage corporate affairs and subordinates. Part IV argues that the current
approaches for adjudicating tort-based supervision and management claims
in the corporate context are, for the most part, inadequate and lack the
necessary protections for directors and officers. Finally, Part V explores
the revised approach by offering an alternative model of corporate tort
liability that is duty-based.
Throughout this Article, the focus will be solely on directors’ and
officers’ tort liability toward non-shareholder third parties in the context of
supervision and management.15 Furthermore, although some of the
arguments put forward in this Article in support of the revised liability
model may also apply to other legal entities—such as Limited Liability
Companies or Limited Liability Partnerships—and their agents, the present
discussion will be limited to the liability of directors and officers of
corporations.16
15. Actions by a corporation or shareholders against its directors and officers, claims
under securities laws, and criminal law sanctions will not be addressed. For a thorough
analysis of managerial liability in the context of fraud on the market, see Jennifer H. Arlen
& William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability For Fraud On Securities Markets: Theory And
Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 720–21 (1992) (proposing a regime of agent liability
and criminal enforcement, but distinguishing liability for fraud on the market from other
corporate tort liabilities).
16. The practical and doctrinal problems that imposition of personal tort liability on
directors and officers creates are not limited to the corporate form. However, the issues are
likely to be more prevalent in the case of business forms with limited liability, whether
incorporated or not. Limited liability may increase the need for creditors to pursue their
claims against directors, officers, LLC managers, or other individuals personally because it
can make it more difficult to fully recover from the entity itself. In addition, without limited
liability, the problem is also less pronounced, as it is likely that individuals who were held
personally liable are in a better position to recover indemnification payments under
agreements with their entity, since these indemnification claims will not be wiped out in
bankruptcy.
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AN OVERVIEW OF TORT LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

Courts tend to impose personal liability on corporate directors and
officers for their torts on the basis that an agent, even if acting on someone
else’s behalf, is personally liable for his or her tortious conduct.17
Following this general principle, a director18 or officer remains personally
responsible for his own torts, even if committed while acting in the scope
of his employment and in his official capacity as director or officer of a
corporation.19 Personal liability attaches even though the director or officer
performed the acts for the benefit of the corporation and without personally
benefiting thereof.20 If a plaintiff so chooses, he may proceed against the
corporation, against the director or officer individually, or against both the
individual actor and the corporation.21
17. General agency principles posit that an individual is personally liable for all torts he
commits, notwithstanding that the person may have acted as an agent or under directions of
another. See Bowles v. Ruppel, 157 F.2d 944, 946 (3d Cir. 1946); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF
AGENCY
§
7.01
(2006);
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF
AGENCY
§§ 343–44 (1957). When an agent acts affirmatively and causes physical harm, the rule is
clear that the fact that he is acting as an agent does not relieve him from liability.
Difficulties sometimes occur with respect to an agent’s conduct which results merely in
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff and to what can be referred to as nonfeasance or a failure by
the agent to perform an act which he ought to do. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
350–57, Reporter’s Notes (2008); infra Part I.A.
18. A director is not, by virtue of his position, the corporation’s agent (or “employee”)
for the purposes of vicarious tort liability; rather, a plaintiff must show that the necessary
degree of control existed. Norris v. Sackett, 665 P.2d 1262, 1263 (Or. Ct. App. 1983). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C cmt. a–b (2006).
19. See Browning-Ferris Indust. of Ill., Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir.
1999); Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir.
1999); Faulk v. Milton, 268 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847(N.Y. App. Div. 1966) ( “[A] director’s
common law liability for his tort persists although it may be within the scope of his
corporate duties and in furtherance of the objects of the corporation.”); Schaefer v. D & J
Produce, Inc., 403 N.E.2d 1015, 1019 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (“Officers are agents of the
corporation and their liability to third persons is governed by the ordinary principles of
agency.”). On the other hand, deviating from what appears to be a well-settled principle,
some courts have posited that absent evidence that an officer of a corporation committed
any tort outside the scope of his capacities as officer, he may not be held individually liable.
See, e.g., Cantwell v. City of Boise, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (Idaho 2008) (“An agent is only
liable for actions which are outside its scope of duty to the corporation.”); Bernstein v.
Starrett
City,
Inc.,
758 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (explaining that defendant officer was
entitled to summary judgment since he established that he did not act in his individual
capacity or commit any tort outside the scope of his capacity as corporation’s president);
Kramer v. Twin County Grocers, 542 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (mem.); see
also Accuimage Diagnostics Corp. v. Terarecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 941, 950 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (suggesting that in order to hold a corporate officer personally liable for his tortious
acts, plaintiff must allege actionable conduct outside of the scope of the officer’s
employment); Rodriguez v. 1414-1422 Ogden Ave. Realty Corp., 758 N.Y.S.2d 43, 44
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (noting that an action against a corporate president was properly
dismissed absent any showing that he had acted in other than his corporate capacity or
committed an independent tort).
20. See, e.g., Huffman v. Poore, 569 N.W.2d 549, 557–58 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997); Saltiel
v. GSI Consultants, Inc., 788 A.2d 268, 273 (N.J. 2002).
21. See, e.g., Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 580 (Cal. 1986);
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Still, at common law, directors and officers are not personally liable for
the torts of a corporation or of any other agent merely because of their
position.22 Instead, some additional connection is required.23 Courts have
developed various approaches to test whether a director or officer has a
sufficient enough connection to a particular tort to hold him personally
liable.24 For the most part, the different theories or approaches overlap to a
certain degree and courts can apply combinations or variations of the
theories. Nevertheless, the theories can be roughly divided into three
approaches: first, and most common, where the court focuses on the
defendant’s participation in a tort; second, where the court focuses on
whether a personal duty was breached; and third, where the court pierces
the corporate veil. In addition, directors and officers can incur liability
under a plethora of statutory provisions.
A. Focus on Participation
In order to assess liability, courts will typically focus on whether a
director or officer participated in the tortious act.25 Courts sometimes refer
Ray-Tek Servs., Inc. v. Parker, 831 N.E.2d 948, 958 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Palomino Mills,
Inc. v. Davidson Mills Corp., 52 S.E.2d 915, 918–20 (N.C. 1949); Strang v. Hollowell, 387
S.E.2d 664, 666 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an officer’s liability is joint and several
with his corporate employer). Since a director or officer who committed a tort in his scope
of employment will be jointly and severally liable together with the corporation, a plaintiff
will not be able to “double dip.” In other words, a tort victim can apportion his damages to
the director/officer and the corporation or to only one of these parties, but the total amounts
recovered must not be larger than his damages.
22. See, e.g., Bernstein, 758 N.Y.S.2d at 659 (finding that the defendant officer was
entitled to summary judgment because “he did not act in his individual capacity or commit
any tort outside the scope of his corporate capacity as president of [the corporation].”);
WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
§ 3.13 (7th ed. 2002). Personal liability based on corporate status may, however, be
imposed by statute. See infra Part I.D.
23. See Bowling v. Holdeman, 413 N.E.2d 1010, 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (providing
that without a connection to the tort liability does not attach simply because the defendant is
the president of the company).
24. For a recent comparative overview of approaches to directors’ tort liability across
various common law jurisdictions, see Helen Anderson, Directors’ Liability for Corporate
Faults and Defaults—An International Comparison, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J.
1, 34–44 (2009).
25. E.g., Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 133 (2d Cir. 2001); Steinke v.
Beach Bungee, Inc., 105 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1997); Indiaweekly.com, L.L.C v.
Nehaflix.com, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 2d 497, 507 (D. Conn. 2009); Lemon v. Harlem
Globetrotters Intern., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1110 (D. Ariz. 2006); Mill Run Assocs. v.
Locke Prop. Co., 282 F. Supp.2d 278, 287 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“[it is a] general, if not
universal, rule . . . that an officer of a corporation who takes part in the commission of a tort
by the corporation is personally liable therefor . . . .”); Gidwitz v. Stirco, Inc., 646 F. Supp.
825, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1986); T.V. Spano Bldg. Corp. v. Dep’t of Natural Res. and Env’t
Control, 628 A.2d 53, 61 (Del. 1993); BTL COM Ltd., Co. v. Vachon, 628 S.E.2d 690, 695
(Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Livonia Bldg. Materials Co. v. Harrison Const. Co., 742 N.W.2d 140,
144 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam); State ex rel. The Doe Run Res. Corp. v. Neill, 128
S.W.3d 502, 505 (Mo. 2004); Walker v. Anderson, 232 S.W.3d 899, 918 (Tex. App. 2007);
Consulting Overseas Mgmt, Ltd. v. Shtikel, 18 P.3d 1144, 1147 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
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to this as the “participation theory.”26 In a leading case on the issue,
Lobato v. Pay Less Drug Stores,27 the Tenth Circuit explained the
circumstances under which directors and officers may become liable in tort
to a third party based on their participation.28 The court explained that, as a
rule, a corporate officer or agent is personally liable to third parties if he
sanctions, directs or actively participates in the commission of a tort.29 An
officer or other corporate agent, the court held, may also be liable for an act
or omission from which a tort necessarily follows or may be reasonably
expected to follow.30
Participation, in this context, can take many different forms. For
instance, it can be sufficient for a director to incur liability if he votes in
favor of a board decision, which later results in harm to a third party,31 or
for a director or officer to be the “guiding spirit” or “central figure” behind
a tortious act.32 Furthermore, it may also suffice that a director or officer
has constructive knowledge of a tort.33 Finally, directors and officers can
be liable if they “reasonably” should have known that some hazardous
condition or activity under their control could injure a third party, but they
negligently failed to take or order appropriate action to avoid the harm.34
Some courts limit the application of the participation theory and,
drawing upon an old distinction between an agent’s acts of nonfeasance
The focus on participation does not mean that there is no requirement of the breach of a
duty. However, the duty requirement is not a central aspect of the analysis. See infra note
47.
26. See, e.g., Bethea v. Bristol Lodge Corp., No. Civ. A. 01-612, 2002 WL 31859434,
at *14 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2002); Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 470 A.2d 86, 90
(Pa. 1983).
27. 261 F.2d 406, (10th Cir. 1958).
28. See id. at 408–09.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Ass’n, 723 P.2d 573, 586 (Cal. 1986)
(en banc) (stating that a director who votes for the commission of a tort is liable even though
the act was committed in the name of the corporation).
32. See Cruz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 619 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing Donsco,
Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 605–06 (3d Cir. 1978)); Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237
F.2d 428, 435 (1st Cir. 1956).
33. See Childs v. Purll, 882 A.2d 227, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (inferring that the two
defendant officers could be held personally liable for their company’s torts because they
were the only two officers and ran the company together); Cotten v. Weatherford
Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687, 701 (Tex. App. 2006) (“A corporate officer may be held
individually liable for a corporation’s tortious conduct if he knowingly participates in the
conduct or has either actual or constructive knowledge of the tortious conduct.”); Bowling
v.
Ansted
Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge,
Inc.,
425 S.E.2d 144, 149 (W. Va. 1992) (finding that the defendant officer could be found liable
for the corporation’s torts based on constructive knowledge of the culpable conduct). But
see Accuimage Diagnostics Corp v. Terarecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 941, 950 (N.D. Cal.
2003) (“[M]ere knowledge of tortious conduct by the corporation is not enough to hold a
director or officer liable for the torts of the corporation absent other ‘unreasonable
participation’ in the unlawful conduct by the individual.”).
34. Frances T., 723 P.2d at 584 (discussing directors’ liability).
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and acts of misfeasance or malfeasance,35 hold that a corporate director or
officer cannot be personally liable for nonfeasance.36 Under this line of
cases, a director or officer is not personally liable for mere omissions or the
nonperformance of acts that he had a duty to carry out. Courts sometimes
explain that in cases of nonfeasance, the claimed negligence consists only
of failing to perform a duty owed to the principal, which is why the person
injured has a cause of action only against the principal, but not against the
agent.37 Nevertheless, the modern rule is that personal liability can attach
regardless of whether the breach was a result of misfeasance or
nonfeasance. Thus, courts can impose personal liability for “participation”
solely based on failures to act.38
B. Focus on Duty
Both the Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Third)
of Agency state that, generally, an agent’s breach of a duty owed to the
principal is not an independent basis for the agent’s tort liability to a third
35. For a discussion of the distinction between misfeasance, malfeasance, and
nonfeasance, see Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Knight, 171 S.E. 919, 920–24 (Ga. Ct. App.
1933). See also Haupt v. Miller, 514 N.W.2d 905, 908–09 (Iowa 1994) (en banc); Schaefer
v. D & J Produce, Inc., 403 N.E.2d 1015, 1019–21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Buck v. Clauson’s
Inn at Coonamessett, Inc., 211 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Mass. 1965).
36. See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 579,
585 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that the defendants’ failure to supervise the corporation’s
employees and failure to learn about the corporation’s financial condition were insufficient
bases for imposing liability); Peguero v. 601 Realty Corp., 2009 WL 196314, at *2 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2009) (“. . . personal liability cannot be imposed on a corporate officer for
nonfeasance . . . .”); Lutz Feed Co., Inc. v. Audet & Co., Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 852, 856 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1972) (granting the defendant officer’s motion to dismiss because the complaint
alleged only that he failed to act); Shay v. Flight C Helicopter Serv., Inc., 822 A.2d 1, 17–19
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (explaining the difference between misfeasance and nonfeasance);
Brindley v. Woodland Vill. Rest., Inc., 652 A.2d 865, 868–70 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(characterizing the plaintiff’s claim, which was premised on the unsafe condition of the
corporation’s restrooms, as nonfeasance as against the defendant officers).
37. See, e.g., Mathis v. Yondata Corp., 480 N.Y.S.2d 173, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
38. See, e.g., Haupt, 514 N.W.2d at 909 (“In determining liability of a corporate officer
for negligence, it is difficult to logically support a legal distinction that exonerates a
corporate officer’s act of nonfeasance while exacting retribution for acts of misfeasance or
malfeasance. In practice, applying such labels may be more descriptive and thus conclusory
than the facts would justify as a difference. Accordingly, we join the modern trend of
jurisdictions applying the general negligence standard, rather than predicating individual
corporate officer liability for negligence on a prerequisite finding of misfeasance or
malfeasance.”); Miller v. Muscarelle, 170 A.2d 437, 446–49 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1961) (tracing the historical roots of the distinction between malfeasance and misfeasance,
concluding that the distinction today “resolves itself into little more than a totally illogical
remnant of the privity doctrine”); Schaefer v. D & J Produce, Inc., 403 N.E.2d 1015, 1020
(Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (“In any event, we question whether any benefit can be derived by
attaching the labels ‘misfeasance’ or ‘nonfeasance’ to particular activity.”); Fields v. Jantec,
Inc., 857 P.2d 95, 97 (Or. 1993) (en banc) (refusing to distinguish between misfeasance and
nonfeasance in evaluating the plaintiff’s claim); 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 520 So. 2d
1276, 1283 (La. Ct. App. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989) (holding
that an officer’s personal liability is independent of whether the breach of his duties was
accomplished through malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance).
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party.39 Thus, conduct that breaches an agent’s duties to his principal does
not necessarily subject the agent to liability to a third party even though the
agent’s conduct also harms the third party.40 Instead, according to the
Restatements of Agency, an agent is only subject to tort liability to a third
party harmed by his conduct when such conduct constitutes a breach of
duty the agent personally owes to the third party.41
More specifically, the Restatement (Second) of Agency as well as
commentary to the Restatement (Third) of Agency distinguish between
purely economic harm and physical harm, i.e. between harm to property
and harm to persons.42 Both Restatements provide that an agent who fails
to perform duties owed solely to his or her principal is not liable to a third
party who has only suffered harm to his or her economic interests.43
Conversely, an agent may be liable to a third party for physical harm, even
if the third party incurs such harm because of the agent’s failure to
adequately perform his or her duties to the principal.44
In accordance with these principles, numerous courts have specifically
stressed that, in order to be liable for his or her actions within the corporate
context, a director or officer must breach an independent duty of care,
which he personally owes to the injured party.45 Such specific inquiry as to
the existence of a duty has the potential to serve as a protective device for
directors and officers carrying out their corporate duties. Courts, however,
often recognize the existence of a personal duty based upon the defendant’s
personal participation in or direction of a tortious act.46 As a result, the
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY §§ 352, 357 (1984).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 cmt. b (2006).
41. Id. at § 7.02.
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.02 cmt. c-d (2006); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 352, 357 (1984).
43. See supra note 42.
44. See supra note 42. In general, the rule of the agent’s non-liability for economic loss
is an overstatement, given the many instances of liability for economic loss. See Greg Allen
Constr. Co. v. Estelle, 798 N.E.2d 171, 174–75 (Ind. 2003) (listing examples of situations
where liability was premised on economic loss from negligent misrepresentation); infra Part
II.A (listing examples where liability for economic harm was premised on negligent
misrepresentations).
45. E.g., Lawlor v. District of Columbia, 758 A.2d 964, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Frances
T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 581 (Cal. 1986) (en banc); Michaelis v.
Benavides, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 778 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Cisneros v. U.D. Registry, Inc.,
46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 233, 255–56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (duty imposed by statute on company,
not
officer
personally);
White
v.
Wal-Mart
Stores,
Inc.,
918 So. 2d 357, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); West v. Bruner Health Group, Inc., 866 So.
2d 260, 269 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 480
(La. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that Louisiana courts have consistently employed a duty-based
analysis in determining officers’ personal liability for injury to third parties); Leitch v.
Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996).
46. See, e.g., McCaskey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 562, 577 (S.D. Tex.
2001) (requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant director breached an independent
duty of care).
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focus on the existence of a personal duty to the plaintiff can become
indistinguishable from a participation-based approach and often does not
serve as an added barrier to holding directors or officers personally liable.47
Another group of cases that focus on duty uses an alternative inquiry to
ascertain personal liability. Under this approach, a director or officer will
be liable for a tort where (1) the corporation owed a duty of care to the
victim; (2) the corporation delegated that duty to the director or officer; and
(3) the director or officer breached the duty of care by his or her own
conduct, causing injury to the victim.48 While this test also focuses on the
existence of a duty, because courts assume that any duty can be delegated
to and create additional liabilities for directors and officers, it disregards
the existence of internal duties that directors and officers owe only to the
corporation. In addition, courts using this test fail to appreciate that
delegation of internal duties does not transform them into duties that
directors and officers owe to third parties.49
C. Veil Piercing
A third approach to holding directors and officers personally liable for
tortious acts is by piercing the corporate veil.50 Under this doctrine, a
47. Granted, courts which focus mainly on whether a director or officer participated in
tortious conduct also require that there exists a duty to a third party. See supra Part I.A.
Indeed, “[w]here there is no duty, there can be no negligence.” Robillard v. Asahi Chem.
Indus. Co., 695 A.2d 1087, 1094 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995) (quoting Anthony v. Connecticut
Co., 92 A. 672, 674 (1914)). However, these courts do not explicitly discuss the
requirement that the defendant director or officer breaches a duty that he personally owes to
the injured party. Thus, it is unclear how these participation-based cases deal with the duty
requirement, i.e. whether they implicitly assume that participation in a certain act or whether
direct or foreseeable contact by itself creates the necessary duty, whether they work under
the assumption that the corporation owed a duty which it then delegated to the individual
director or officer, or whether they follow yet another approach.
48. E.g., Manning v. United Med. Corp. of New Orleans, 902 So. 2d 406, 410–12 (La.
Ct. App. 2005); Downey v. Callery, 338 So. 2d 937, 943–944 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 (1977); Saltiel v. GSI Consultants, Inc.,
788 A.2d 268, 272 (N.J. 2002) (treating the requirement of a duty being delegated to and
breached by a director or officer as part of the “participation theory”); Metuchen Sav. Bank
v. Pierini, 871 A.2d 759, 764 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Schaefer v. D & J Produce,
Inc., 403 N.E.2d 1015, 1020–21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978). Courts that use this test have
sometimes pointed out that if the defendant’s general responsibility has been delegated with
due care to some responsible subordinate or subordinates, he is not himself personally at
fault and liable for the negligent performance of this responsibility unless he personally
knows or personally should know of its nonperformance or malperformance and has
nevertheless failed to cure the risk of harm. See, e.g., Manning, 902 So. 2d at 411.
49. See infra Part III.A (discussing the distinction between internal and external duties).
50. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Stirco, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 825, 829–30 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(explaining that where the individual is considered the “alter ego” of the corporation, courts
may disregard the separate corporate existence and impose liability on the individual);
Maggio v. Becca Const. Co., 644 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant officers
treated the corporation as their alter ego). The doctrine is perhaps more commonly known
as a tool by which courts may hold shareholders, but not directors or officers, liable for the
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separate corporate identity may be disregarded and liability imposed upon
an individual if a court finds that the corporation is controlled and operated
in a manner that makes it a “mere instrumentality of another” and that the
“observance of the fiction of separate existence would, under the
circumstances, sanction fraud or promote injustice.”51 Interestingly, under
a veil-piercing approach, courts can find directors and officers personally
liable in cases where they did not participate in the tortious acts and where
there would be no liability under participation or duty-based theories.52
D. Statutory Liability
In addition to the possibility of incurring liability under general tort and
agency theories, directors and officers can be civilly and criminally liable
under a growing collection of regulatory statutes. These include the
National Banking Act,53 the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,54 the
Lanham Act,55 the Patent Act,56 the Copyright Act,57 the Sherman AntiTrust Act,58 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,59 the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA),60 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,61 and the
debts of the corporation. A classic case in point is Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8–
10 (N.Y. 1966), which discusses the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil within the
context of shareholder liability specifically.
51. Gidwitz, 646 F. Supp. at 830 (citing Main Bank of Chicago v. Baker,
427 N.E.2d 94, 101 (Ill. 1981)); see also Lambert v. Kazinetz, 250 F. Supp. 2d 908, 914
(S.D. Ohio 2003).
52. See Smith v. Hawks, 355 S.E.2d 669, 675–76 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing the
“piercing the corporate veil” exception to the general rule of non-liability for a corporate
officer who did not participate in tortious conduct).
53. del Junco v. Conover, 682 F.2d 1338, 1341–42 (9th Cir. 1982) (explaining that § 93
of the National Banking Act imposes liability on directors for violating, or allowing
violations, of the banking laws).
54. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676–77 (1975) (noting that the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act holds corporate officials responsible for remedying and preventing
violations, including continuing violations, of the Act).
55. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir. 1978) (explaining that the
principle that a corporate officer is individually liable for torts he personally commits also
applies to acts constituting unfair competition).
56. See, e.g., Hoover Group v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 84 F.3d 1408, 1412
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that, under the Patent Act, corporate officers are personally liable if
they assist with the corporation’s infringement); see also Lynda J. Oswald, The Personal
Liability of Corporate Officers for Patent Infringement, 44 IDEA 115–17 (2003) (criticizing
the erosion of traditional protections provided to corporate officers in the area of patent
infringement).
57. Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1177 (D. Colo. 1988) (stating that a
corporate officer may be held liable if he or she is responsible for the corporation’s
copyright infringement).
58. United States v. Am. Radiator & Std. Sanitary. Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 188
(3d Cir. 1970) (noting that a corporate officer is subject to prosecution under § 1 of the
Sherman Act whenever he or she knowingly participates in violations of the Act).
59. Mone v. Dranow, 945 F.2d 306, 308 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (noting that
federal and state law holds corporate officers are personally liable for their torts even if they
were committed on the corporation’s behalf).
60. Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 387–88 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),62 among
others. Furthermore, environmental statutes such as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),63
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),64 and others are
significant sources of directors’ and officers’ liability.65
The prerequisites for personal liability for tort-like statutory violations
vary and depend on the specific statute. However, the various statutory
liabilities display some common themes. First, a marked difference
between common law liability theories and regulatory statutes that can
impose personal liability is that the latter may extend civil and criminal
liability without a need to demonstrate intent or negligence.66 Second,
regulatory statutes may impose liability on “controlling persons” who
would normally not be liable under traditional corporate, tort, or agency
law principles.67 Under these statutes, some federal and state courts impose
liability on individual corporate actors through the “responsible corporate
officer doctrine,”68 a theory of liability separate from piercing the corporate
that a corporate officer with operational control who is directly responsible for a failure to
pay statutorily required wages can be personally liable for the shortfall).
61. For example, directors and officers may incur liability under Sarbanes-Oxley’s
document destruction and whistleblower provisions. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act 18 U.S.C. §
1513 et seq.
62. Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675, 680 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“Congress did not limit
the scope of RICO to those involved in what has traditionally been thought of as organized
crime.”).
63. See, e.g., Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420–
21 (7th Cir. 1994) (adopting an expanded standard of liability under CERCLA); United
States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (opining that
“construction of CERCLA to impose liability upon only the corporation and not the
individual corporate officers and employees who are responsible for making corporate
decisions about the handling and disposal of hazardous substances would open an
enormous, and clearly unintended, loophole in the statutory scheme”);
New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1052–53 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that individuals
can be considered “owners” or “operators” under CERCLA).
64. United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 745–46 (1986).
65. See KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 22, §§ 10.01–10.06 (summarizing the potential
liability corporate directors face in connection with violations of various environmental
laws).
66. Timothy P. Glynn, Beyond “Unlimiting” Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort
Liability for Corporate Officers, 57 VAND. L. REV. 329, 357 (2004).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Comm’r, Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt. v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ind.
2001) (explaining that an individual, though acting in a corporate capacity as an officer,
director, or employee, may be individually liable under Indiana environmental management
laws either as a responsible corporate officer, as a direct participant under general legal
principles, or under specific statutes or provisions). The responsible officer doctrine is often
traced back to United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), where the Supreme Court
allowed criminal liability to be imposed on a corporate officer under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Id. The Court held that any persons who have a
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the Act outlaws could be
personally liable. Id. at 284–85. The theory has subsequently been applied in the context of
criminal as well as civil liability. See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 187, 193 n.4,
195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (utilizing the responsible corporate officer doctrine to impose civil
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veil or imposing personal liability for direct participation in tortious
conduct.69
The responsible corporate officer doctrine holds that a director, officer,
or other corporate actor may be personally liable if: (1) the individual is in
a position of responsibility which allows the individual to influence
corporate policies or activities; (2) there is a nexus between the individual’s
position and the violation in question such that the individual could have
influenced the corporate actions which constituted the violations; and (3)
the individual’s actions or inactions facilitated the violations.70 Courts
have usually applied the doctrine in the context of offenses against public
welfare related statutes that impose strict liability schemes,71 such as in the
context of violations of federal or state environmental legislation.72
However, courts have used the doctrine in various other areas as well.73 In
particular, a notable recent development in this regard is evidenced by
attempts to enforce actions alleging Foreign Corrupt Practices Act74
violations against corporate officials based on a “control person” theory.75
II. DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ TORT LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISION AND
MANAGEMENT
As demonstrated in the preceding section, various approaches exist for
determining whether directors and officers can incur personal liability for a
myriad of torts committed in their official capacity. This Part focuses on
two particular, and often interrelated, types of torts for which directors and
officers can be held personally liable: supervision and management of
corporate affairs and subordinates. The first section outlines judicial
approaches to directors’ and officers’ tort liability for supervision and
liability, but noting that the distinction between civil and criminal liability is irrelevant).
69. Celentano v. Rocque, 923 A.2d 709, 721 n.11 (Conn. 2007) (explaining the
rationale for implementing the responsible corporate officer doctrine).
70. Matter of Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
71. See Microsoft Corp. v. Ion Tech. Corp., 484 F. Supp. 2d 955, 962 (D. Minn. 2007)
(declining to apply the doctrine to consider liability for copyright infringement); Celentano,
923 A.2d at 722–23.
72. E.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743–44
(8th Cir. 1986); Roscoe, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 191–95; Comm’r, Dept. of Envtl. Mgmt.,
755 N.E.2d at 560–62; State v. Rollfink, 475 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Wis. 1991).
73. See, e.g., Monarch Marking Sys., Inc. v. Duncan Parking Meter Maint. Co.,
No. 82 C 2599, 1986 WL 3625, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 1986) (anti-trust violation);
Wittenberg v. Gallagher, No. 1 CA-CV 01-0168, 2001 WL 34048121, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Nov. 20, 2001) (securities violations); Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales and Mktg., Inc., 475
N.W.2d 210, 219–20 (Iowa 1991) (consumer fraud).
74. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat 1494 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
75. See Kevin LaCroix, 3ew Exposure for Corporate Officials: Control Person
DIARY,
Aug.
24,
2009,
Liability
for
FCPA
Violations,
D&O
http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/ 08/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/new-exposurefor-corporate-officials-control-person-liability-for-fcpa-violations.

PETRIN_OFF_TO_PRINTER_CORREX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/3/2010 10:45 AM

2010]THE CURIOUS CASE OF DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY 1675
management under common law negligence theories while the second
section discusses analogous claims based on statutory provisions.
Interestingly, the rules to assess directors’ and officers’ tort-based
liability for supervision and management do not differ based on the various
types of defendants or corporations that are involved. Rather, courts appear
to apply the various tests—as used in their respective jurisdiction—
regardless of whether the defendant is a director or officer, an inside
director or an outside director, or whether the corporation is closely or
publicly held.76 Yet, the cases reviewed for the purposes of this section—a
number too small to be of any empirical relevance—indicate that both the
risk of being a defendant and the likelihood of incurring liability in a
supervision or management case are higher for officers and inside directors,
as opposed to outside directors.77
A. Common Law 3egligence Claims
Following from the general principle that directors and officers may be
liable for torts committed in their corporate capacities, courts can hold
directors and officers personally liable for the torts of negligent supervision
and management with regard to corporate activities and subordinates.78
Methods for ascertaining liability for supervision and management can
vary. Some courts analyze these types of claims by inquiring into whether
the defendant participated in tortious conduct.79 Other courts focus on the
requirement of the breach of a personal duty.80 Still other courts appear to
treat supervision and management related claims as a sui generis category
of torts, different from general tort liability, based on participation in or
76. Of the cases reviewed for this article, none contained any language that would
indicate that courts make such express distinctions. See also supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
77. This is probably because officers and inside directors are in closer proximity to their
corporation’s daily business than outside directors, a fact sometimes implicitly
acknowledged by courts in their definition of the scope of a defendant’s duty. See, e.g.,
Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 50 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943) (“The duties [to
supervise] of a general manager of a corporation are usually more extensive than those of a
mere director.”).
78. E.g., Jabczenski v. S. Pac. Mem. Hosps., 579 P.2d 53, 58 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978);
Smith v. Isaacs, 777 S.W.2d 912, 914–15 (Ky. 1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 358(1) (1958) (“The agent of a disclosed or partially disclosed principal is not
subject to liability for the conduct of other agents unless he is at fault in appointing,
supervising, or cooperating with them.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877 (1979)
(summarizing liability for harm resulting from the directed conduct of another).
79. E.g., Adel v. Greensprings of Vermont, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 692, 700
(D. Vt. 2005); Omaha Indem. Co. v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1488, 1492
(W.D. Mo. 1991); Detig, 50 N.E.2d at 603–04; Smith, 777 S.W.2d at 914–15.
80. E.g., Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 579, 585
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Shay v. Flight C Helicopter Servs., Inc., 822 A.2d 1, 17–19
(Pa. Super. 2003); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 S.E.2d 51, 53–
54 (W.Va. 1941).
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knowledge of an illegal act.81 In these latter cases, the test appears to be
simply whether there were negligent supervisory or managerial acts, which
led to harm incurred by a third party. In addition, courts may also rely on a
combination of the aforementioned approaches.82
Principally, a director or officer cannot be individually liable for
negligent supervision or management where the claim relates primarily to a
breach of contract, not negligence.83 Nevertheless, there are cases
involving successful supervision and management claims against directors
and officers, even where there was an underlying agreement between the
plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ respective corporate employers.84
In general, the tort of negligent supervision sanctions not an act, but
rather an omission. Thus, a director or officer may be liable for failures in
the supervision and control of corporate affairs85 as well as for torts
committed by agents of the corporation if he or she fails to act with due
diligence in his or her supervision.86 The latter is especially true in cases
where there is not only a single, isolated incident, but where the agents’
tortious acts occur persistently and continuously for substantial periods of
time and the director or officer had the opportunity to discover the
wrongful acts.87 Similarly, courts can impose liability where directors or
officers are negligent in failing to learn of and prevent torts by
employees.88 Nevertheless, directors and officers are not required to
81. See Jabczenski, 579 P.2d at 58 (identifying three distinct bases of personal liability
for corporate torts under Arizona law: (1) participation; (2) knowledge amounting to
acquiescence, and; (3) negligent management and supervision); accord Avery v. Solargizer
Intern., Inc., 427 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“Generally, a corporate officer is
not liable for torts of the corporation’s employees unless he participated in, directed, or was
negligent in failing to learn of and prevent the tort.”).
82. E.g., Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 583–86 (Cal. 1986) (en
banc) (articulating considerations for determining liability based on various standards).
83. E.g., Westminster Const. Co., v. Sherman, 554 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301–02
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (mem.) (explaining the limitation of corporate officer liability in the
context of contracts).
84. E.g., Omaha Indem. Co., 777 F. Supp. at 1492 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Sergeants
Benevolent Ass’n Annuity Fund v. Renck, 796 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80–81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
85. E.g., Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 56 P. 358, 361 (Mont. 1899)
(stating that directors may be liable where they fail to exercise reasonable diligence in the
control and supervision of the corporate business); see also Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614,
616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (holding that an allegation that a director failed to devote adequate
attention to his company’s affairs stated a cause of action in tort where proper attention
would have avoided loss).
86. See, e.g., Air Traffic Conference of Am. v. Marina Travel, Inc., 316 S.E.2d 642,
645 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (finding insufficient factual support to establish that the defendant
neglected to exercise due care in choosing trustworthy employees or that she had fair
opportunity to discover a diversion of company proceeds).
87. See Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 50 N.E.2d 602, 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943);
Air Traffic Conference of Am., 316 S.E.2d at 645.
88. E.g., Avery v. Solargizer Int’l., Inc., 427 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988);
Preston-Thomas Const., Inc. v. Cent. Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Ct. App.
1973) ( “[The e]xistence of circumstances and facts which would arouse the suspicions of an
ordinary prudent business man will furnish a basis” for directors’ or officers’ personal
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personally supervise all of the details of every business transaction.89
Instead, directors can delegate the management of the daily business to
subordinate officers as long as they do not divest themselves of the duty of
general supervision and control of the corporate affairs.90
In contrast, the situations in which the rather elusive tort of negligent
management may arise are more difficult to describe in general terms. The
tort of negligent management can consist both of an action, such as an
improper management decision, as well as an omission, such as a failure to
properly
manage
a
business
or
a
specific aspect thereof. Often, courts will not even explicitly refer to
“negligent management” or “mismanagement” when imposing tort liability
based upon alleged managerial failures. It is therefore best to look at some
practical examples of cases involving management and supervision
claims—which tend to overlap—to trace the contours of these two torts.
With respect to supervision and management cases involving harm to
persons, for example, the Montana Supreme Court held that directors could
be potentially liable for the death of a person killed by an explosion in their
corporate warehouse where the directors did not exercise reasonable
diligence in the control and supervision of the corporate business.91 In
another case, the Nebraska Supreme Court found a sufficient cause of
action for negligence where an officer failed to properly train and supervise
a trenching machine operator because the operator’s action resulted in the
plaintiff’s death and the supervisor knew or should have known that the
machine operator would perform the job assigned to him negligently.92
The Supreme Court of California recognized a cause of action against
individual board members of a condominium owner’s non-profit
corporation for alleged negligence in the board members’ decision not to
provide adequate lighting where an intruder attacked a resident in her
condominium unit.93 Similarly, a New York court held that individual
liability if they failed “to make reasonable inquiry and act with due care regarding the
suspicions”). But cf. Becker v. Tools & Metals, Inc., No. 3:05-CV-0627-L, 2009 WL
577604, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2009) (holding that under California law, a corporate
officer did not have a legal duty to uncover alleged fraud).
89. E.g., Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 385,
393–94 (N.C. 1988); Preston-Thomas Const., Inc., 518 P.2d at 1127.
90. Detig, 50 N.E.2d at 603 (limiting the extent to which a director can delegate
responsibility to subordinates).
91. Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 56 P. 358, 361 (Mont. 1899). In
another case, however, corporate officers were not personally liable for an explosion in their
sugar company and resulting damages to employees, neighbors, and an additional nonemployee plaintiff in absence of showing of any negligence on their part or any basis for res
ipsa loquitur inference against them. Moak v. Link-Belt Co., 229 So. 2d 395, 416 (La. Ct.
App. 1970), rev’d in part on other grounds, 242 So. 2d 515, 520–21 (La. 1970).
92. Carlson v. Metz, 532 N.W.2d 631, 634–36 (Neb. 1995).
93. Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 584–86 (Cal. 1986)
(en banc).
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officers of companies associated with a shopping mall, who reduced or
eliminated security measures to maximize profits, could be personally
liable to a patron who sustained injuries during a shooting incident at the
mall.94 Finally, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the defendants summary
judgment in a case where the plaintiffs claimed that directors who operated
a city-owned coliseum, but who failed to implement security measures
designed to protect rock concert patrons from a dangerous condition caused
by a first-come-first-served seating policy, should be held personally
liable.95
Negligent supervision and management claims have also found some
success in cases involving purely economic loss. For example, the
president and CEO of a reinsurance management firm was held personally
liable to a reinsurer for the amount of $132.3 million when he failed to
exercise due care in evaluating and monitoring underwriting risks assumed
on behalf of the reinsurer.96
Possible negligent management and
supervision by a school’s director and corporate president precluded
summary judgment on students’ claim that the director should be held
personally liable for corporate torts resulting from an employee’s alleged
misrepresentations relating to education, housing, and job placement
assistance to students.97 Finally the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division found a cognizable claim against an investment advisory firm’s
officers for their alleged mismanagement in relation to investment advice
and negligent supervision of a portfolio manager.98
There are courts, however, that are clearly disinclined to hold directors
and officers personally liable for negligent supervision and management.
These courts have concluded, for example, that a failure to supervise or
manage does not rise to the level of personal participation necessary to hold
a director or officer personally liable.99 Courts may also rely on the
principle that directors and officers cannot be liable for mere nonfeasance
and, by characterizing lack of management and supervision as pure
omissions, apply this theory to bar individual liability.100 The reluctance to
94. Haire v. Bonelli, 870 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
95. Bowes v. Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 904, 909–12 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1983).
96. Omaha Indem. Co. v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (W.D.
Mo. 1991).
97. Keams v. Tempe Tech. Inst., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 714, 724–26 (D. Ariz. 1997).
98. Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Annuity Fund v. Renck, 796 N.Y.S.2d 77, 80–81 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005).
99. E.g., Adel v. Greensprings of Vermont, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 692, 700 (D. Vt.
2005) (requiring that a corporate officer have either specifically or personally directed or
participated in the commission of a tort in order to incur liability).
100. E.g., Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 579, 585
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (failing to supervise employees constitutes nonfeasance and a violation of
the duty owed to the corporation but does not make corporate officers or directors
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impose liability for nonfeasance is usually coupled with the idea that
instances of nonfeasance concern duties which are owed only to the
corporation, but not to a third-party tort claimant.101 Finally, courts have
declined to impose personal liability for supervision and management,
without resorting to the nonfeasance/misfeasance dichotomy, based solely
upon the idea that directors and officers owe these duties exclusively to the
corporation, independent of whether the underlying alleged misconduct
was characterized as an act or omission.102
Following these approaches, courts have refused to find directors and
officers personally liable for negligent supervision and management in
cases such as the following: a corporate president’s failure to adequately
supervise a subordinate manager responsible for the clean water supply at a
condominium complex;103 directors’ and officers’ failure to take deductions
from employees’ wages to pay premiums on insurance policies in an
insolvent corporation;104 the failure of a helicopter service company’s
president to supervise the maintenance work of a mechanic that led to a
flying accident;105 and directors’ and officers’ failure to prevent
defalcations by properly supervising corporate employees.106
B. Statutory Claims
Supervision and management claims can also appear in the context of
statutory liability for directors and officers. Although most statutes
generally do not include the terms “supervision” or “management,” they
can impose obligations upon directors and officers that, upon closer
examination, strongly resemble directors’ and officers’ duties to supervise
or manage under common law or corporate laws. This is particularly true
personally liable to third parties); U.S. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 463 P.2d
770, 775 (Cal. 1970) (Finding that a corporate president and principal officer was not
personally liable for negligent handling of a corporate client’s business); Shay v. Flight C
Helicopter Services, Inc., 822 A.2d 1, 17–19 (Pa. Super. 2003) (failing to inspect work of
subordinate constituted nonfeasance and was not considered a basis to impose personal
liability on corporate officer); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 17
S.E.2d 51, 53–54 (W.Va. 1941) (holding that in the absence of an active intent to deceive or
defraud creditors, the officers and directors will not be liable for simple nonfeasance of a
duty to the corporation or fraud in its management or mismanagement in the disposition of
money or property); Webb v. Cash, 250 P. 1, 5–6 (Wyo. 1926) (finding that in the absence
of deliberate or reckless conduct, state bank directors’ failure to know of statutory violations
did not render the directors’ personally liable for the plaintiff’s resulting loss).
101. See Airlines Reporting Corp., 721 F. Supp. at 585 (classifying a duty to supervise as
a duty owed to a corporation and refusing to extend personal liability to officers or directors
for a breach of that duty).
102. E.g., Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 481 (La. Ct. App. 1982); see also infra
note 138 and accompanying text.
103. Adel, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 700.
104. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co., 17 S.E.2d at 53–54.
105. Shay, 822 A.2d at 17–19.
106. Airlines Reporting Corp., 721 F. Supp. at 585.
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for statutes that base liability on directors’ or officers’ control or
responsibility for a company or certain aspects of its business operations
because under these statutes, the basis of the defendants’ liability is, in fact,
lack of supervision or management.107
For example, the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine allows courts
to impose personal liability on corporate directors, officers, and other
actors based solely on their corporate status and their authority to prevent
certain violations of the law.108 Under the doctrine, even in the absence of
an individual’s participation in or knowledge of a wrongful act, someone
deemed a “responsible corporate officer” can be held liable for acts of
corporate subordinates and for failures to prevent or correct such acts.109
In an early case110 that applied the responsible corporate officer doctrine
in the context of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,111 the Supreme
Court opined that “individuals who execute the corporate mission”112 have
a “positive duty to seek out and remedy violations of [the Act] when they
occur” and “a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations
will not occur.”113
The court’s foregoing characterization of the duties in question is
reminiscent of the duties imposed by common law supervision liability,
which posits that directors or officers can be liable for failing to detect and
prevent tortious conduct by employees. The language of the holding also
has a mismanagement dimension, as directors and officers may arguably
minimize violations of food and drug regulations by taking the appropriate
safety and organizational measures, both of which are dependent upon
management decisions.114 In addition, the duty to implement measures to
avoid future violations, as described by the court, appears to be analogous
to directors’ and officers’ corporate law oversight duties under cases such
107. See, e.g., infra note 110 and accompanying text.
108. See supra Part I.D.
109. See id.; Glynn, supra note 66, at 360 (noting that the doctrine imposes a form of
liability on controlling persons that is “akin to vicarious liability”). In at least one case, a
corporate officer was personally liable for an environmental offense even though she did not
take an active part in the business operations and never set company policy. See Hawaii v.
Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 615 P.2d 730, 737–38 (Haw. 1980). Furthermore, the doctrine
also appears to create non-delegable duties for corporate managers. In fact, delegation of
duties may even bolster a claim that someone was a responsible officer in the sense of the
doctrine. As one court has noted: “[S]ince delegation is done by those with a broad range
of responsibilities, the delegation shows that the defendant was responsible for the overall
operation of [the company’s] facility.” State v. Rollfink, 475 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Wis. 1991).
110. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
111. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 301(k), 21 U.S.C. 331(k).
112. Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
113. Id.
114. See id. (Standing for the proposition that the “foresight” and “vigilance” required by
United States v. Dotterweich, 230 U.S. 277 (1943) will include that “individuals who
execute the corporate mission” implement measures that will insure that violations will not
occur).
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as In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation115 and its
progeny.116
Similar results have occurred in other areas such as violations of
intellectual property statutes based on failures in exercising supervision. In
one case, a plaintiff brought a copyright infringement action in connection
with the alleged use of a travel guide in the production of travel
videotapes.117 The court confirmed that plaintiffs could assert a claim for
copyright infringement against an officer who participated in his
corporation’s infringing activities.118 However, the court also went on to
explain that such claims need not necessarily allege that the individual had
knowledge of and participated in the infringing conduct.119 Instead, a
corporate officer who had the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity could be held personally liable.120
Similarly, in another case alleging a violation of the Communications
Act of 1934,121 an individual was held liable in her capacity as a corporate
officer, director, shareholder, and principal.122 In order to establish
liability, the plaintiff had to show that the defendant “had a right and ability
to supervise the violations, and that she had a strong financial interest in
such activities.”123
III. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH TORT-BASED LIABILITY FOR
SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT
Despite the numerous ways by which directors and officers can be held
personally liable for supervision and management failures, augmenting the
scope of directors’ and officers’ duties in these areas poses some problems.
To be sure, an enlarged scope of duty for supervision and management can
benefit tort victims by increasing the pool of potential defendants and
available assets. At the same time, however, an enlarged scope of duty for
supervision and management fails to distinguish between the corporation’s

115. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
116. See id. at 967–68 (holding that boards, regardless of any notice of actual
wrongdoing, have a duty to assure themselves that reasonably designed information and
reporting systems with regards to “the corporation’s compliance with law and its business
performance” are in place); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370
(Del. 2006) (en banc), aff’g, No. Civ. A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Jan.
26, 2006); In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122–24 (Del.
Ch. 2009).
117. Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1167 (D. Colo. 1988).
118. Id. at 1177–79.
119. Id. at 1179
120. Id.
121. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006).
122. J & J Sports Prod., Inc. v. Ribeiro, 562 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
123. See id. at 501 (quoting J&J Sports Prod., Inc., v. Meyers, No. 06 Civ. 5431, 2007
WL 2030288, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2007)).
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duties and directors’ and officers’ duties; fails to align corporate and tort
law liability standards; neglects the corporate shield; and misaligns costs
and benefits.
A. Distinguishing Between Internal and External Duties
1.

Internal versus external duties
Cases holding directors and officers liable in tort for supervision and
management, either under common law or based on tort-like statutory
violations, share a common trait. They work under the explicit or implicit
assumption that directors and officers owe their duties of supervision and
management of corporate affairs and subordinates to both the corporation
and to third parties.
Consequently, many courts dealing with common law tort claims based
on supervision and management treat them like any other tort claim against
corporate agents. They ask whether a defendant was a participant in
tortious conduct, or, if the particular court treats supervision and
management as a separate species of torts, inquire into whether the
defendant’s
conduct
was
negligent
and
whether
it was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s harm.124 If there is a statutory
claim, the reasoning can be similar, but the bases for imposing liability can
also be much broader. Under certain statutes, it can suffice that a director
or officer was in control of a company’s business operations in order to
impose liability, regardless of any showing of actual participation or
negligence.125
On reflection, however, these approaches seem inadequate and
overbroad for determining tort-based supervision and management claims.
In the corporate context courts should, instead, begin by examining
whether it was the corporation, the director or officer, or both who owed a
duty to the third party. Notably, courts should not assume that a director or
officer owed a duty to a third party simply by virtue of his participation in
an alleged tort or due to his negligence in carrying out (or failing to carry
out) a certain act. Because one can construe almost every aspect of
corporate conduct to involve some sort of supervisory or managerial
mistake—especially in smaller corporations in which directors and officers
are involved in the daily operations—the threshold for holding directors
and officers liable in tort is too easily met in the absence of a preliminary
duty-focused analysis. Similarly, liability based solely on a defendant’s
position of authority within a company or control of certain business
operations—a form of liability sometimes created by statute or judicial
124. See supra Part II.A.
125. See supra Part II.B.
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interpretation thereof—is equally inappropriate, since a corporate position
of authority by itself should not create any duties to third parties.
Accordingly, rather than only examining participation in an act,
negligent conduct of the director or officer, or exercise of control over a
business, courts should first examine the nature of the duty that allegedly
has been breached and then determine to whom such duty is owed.126
Generally, if the breach is of a purely internal duty, the director or officer
should not be held liable because the duty is owed to the corporation.127
Contrariwise, the director or officer may be held liable for the breach of
an external duty because that duty is specifically owed to the third party.128
To put it another way, courts must distinguish between a director or
officer’s fiduciary duties to the corporation (and its shareholders) and a
director or officer’s duty not to injure third parties under common law tort
principles.129
Of course, distinguishing between internal and external duties may be a
challenging task for courts.130 Several considerations may be helpful in this
regard. One way to distinguish between internal duties (owed to the
corporation) and external duties (owed to third parties) is to link the
distinction with the difference between indirect and direct harm. In cases
of indirect harm, the director or officer’s conduct will not be the final link
in the causal chain leading to the third party’s injury. Instead, there will be
other conduct or other causes that are in closer proximity to the harm
actually incurred. In other words, the injury is outside of the “scope” of the
specific conduct in question. Since indirect harm is often an indication of
the breach of a purely internal duty, only the corporation should be liable to
third parties for indirect harm in most cases.131
126. Of course, legislators may craft statutory provisions that explicitly create certain
duties that directors or officers owe to third parties. In cases involving such provisions,
courts have to sanction any breaches thereof and analyses of a duty’s internal or external
nature are superfluous. However, if statutory provisions are open to judicial interpretation
as to whether a director or officer is an appropriate defendant and can be liable (or whether
only the corporation can be liable), courts should carefully analyze the nature of the duty at
question, focusing on the distinction between internal and external duties.
127. But see infra Part IV.A (proposing that, in order to mitigate moral hazard problems,
directors and officers should remain liable for breaches of internal duties in cases of
intentional inflictions of harm).
128. But see infra Part IV.B (suggesting a model under which personal liability for
breaches of external duties can only be imposed if there is a showing of at least grossly
negligent conduct).
129. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 581–82 (Cal. 1986) (en
banc).
130. Nevertheless, courts should be mindful of the fact that in the tort context, “duty”
remains a relatively flexible and policy-driven concept. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (“[L]egal duties are not discoverable
facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability
should be imposed for damage done.”).
131. For a similar idea in the context of worker’s compensation, see Steele v. Eaton, 285
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Examples of indirect harm abound. For instance, a failure to prevent
tortious conduct or to detect fraud by an employee or a third party, which is
a possible breach of the duty to supervise, results in indirect harm. In
contrast, it is the employee or the third party’s conduct that will result in
the direct harm. Indirect harm can also take the form of misguided
investment advice, which can result in a possible case of negligent
management. In this scenario, it will be market movements or other events,
and not the misguided advice per se, which will ultimately cause the direct
monetary harm.
Internal and external duties can also be distinguished by looking to
whether the duty in question is one that is owed by an ordinary individual,
not acting as a corporate agent, to a third party.132 In short, duties that are
not ordinarily owed to third parties are internal duties and thus cannot be
the source of personal tortious liability for directors and officers. For
example, individuals do not commonly owe third parties a duty to “manage
carefully.” In fact, it is difficult to imagine mismanagement claims outside
of a corporate or business setting. Thus, the duty to manage is not a duty
that any individual owes to another party. Consequently, courts should
view the duty to manage as a duty that a corporate director or officer owes
only to the corporation and the exclusive bearer of an external duty to
manage has to be the corporation.
The situation is slightly different in the case of the duty to supervise. For
example, the Restatement (Second) of Agency specifically states that an
agent may be liable to third parties based on his negligence in supervising
other agents appointed by his principal.133 In addition, an individual’s duty
to supervise is common in various areas of tort law, such as parental or
medical liability.134 Nevertheless, the duty to supervise arises only in

A.2d 749 (Vt. 1971). In Steele, an employee who had suffered an injury during an industrial
accident sought recovery from the corporate president, claiming that
he was negligent in not providing adequate workplace safety. Id. at 751–52. The Supreme
Court of Vermont shielded the corporate president (who was not present at the time of the
accident) from personal liability, holding that the necessary “immediacy of participation”
was not present given that other, intermediate, supervisors were on the scene of the accident.
Id. at 752–53. The court also stressed that there must have been “acts constituting direct
negligence” toward the plaintiff in order to state a successful claim. Id. at 751. The
“immediacy of participation” or “proximity” test pronounced in Steele was later abolished in
Garrity v. Manning, 671 A.2d 808, 811 (Vt. 1996).
132. For example, a director or officer owes a third party the same duty to exercise due
care not to injure that party which any individual person owes to another. The injured party
may have a tort cause of action for damages against the director or officer if an injury is
sustained as the result of a breach of the duty which the director or officer as an individual
owes to the third party. See Frances T., 723 P.2d at 581 n.12 (citing Saucier v. U.S. Fid.
and Guar. Co., 280 So. 2d 584, 585–86 (La. App. 1973)).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 358(1) (1958).
134. See, e.g., WILLIAM PROSSER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 383–85, 914–15 (5th ed.
1984).
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situations in which an individual is in a position in which he is legally
obliged to exercise control over another.135
In the case of a director or officer, the obligation to exercise control
arises only within the corporate hierarchy. Without the corporation, the
director or officer would not have an obligation to exercise control over
subordinate employees. For example, unlike the duty not to expose others
to unreasonable risks when driving a car, the duty to supervise is not a duty
that any individual commonly owes. Accordingly, this is an indication that
the
duty
to
supervise
also represents a director or officer’s internal duty. In sum, both
supervision and management are not duties commonly imposed upon the
public at large. They are duties that individuals acting as corporate
directors and officers136 would not have absent the existence of the
corporation.137
An illustration of the ease with which a court can distinguish between
internal and external duties is found in Donnelly v. Handy.138 The plaintiffs
charged a corporate officer, Noble Handy, with negligent supervision and
management in connection with a suit arising out of various disputes as to
the quality of workmanship under a contract concerning the construction of
plaintiffs’ residence. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a
cause of action against Mr. Handy and found that he did not owe a personal
135. Id. at 384.
136. Directors’ and officers’ roles consist in great part of supervision and management.
Directors, as part of a corporate board, typically carry out a supervisory or monitoring
function and engage in certain (at least in larger corporations, high-level) managerial tasks.
See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 11–15 (5th ed. 2007)
(enumerating, broadly, the overall responsibilities of corporate directors); STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 195 (2002) (explaining that the
monitoring function remains the board’s chief role). Officers, on the other hand, are in
charge of managing the corporation’s daily business as well as exercising certain
supervisory functions. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 (1994). In addition, both
directors and officers have within their scope, a positive duty to implement appropriate
internal controls to monitor legal compliance and business risks. See Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006), aff’g, No. Civ. A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558 (Del. Ch. 2006); In
re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(explaining that directors may be liable “under some set of facts” for failing to properly
monitor business risks); see also Miller v. McDonald, 385 B.R. 576, 592 (Bankr. Del. 2008)
(expanding In re Caremark oversight duties to officers).
137. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 582 (Cal. 1986) (“[A]
broad application of agency principles to corporate decision-makers would not adequately
distinguish the directors’ duty of care to third persons, which is quite limited, from their
duty to supervise broad areas of corporate activity.”).
138. 415 So. 2d 478 (La. Ct. App. 1982). Donnelly involved a contract between the
plaintiffs and the defendant officer’s corporation. The outcome of the case might therefore
also be explained as following the principle that contractual claims cannot be brought as tort
claims. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. The court, however, did not limit its
opinion in such manner and specifically addressed the possibility of a successful tort claim
against the defendant. Thus, the holding is not limited to claims which arise out of a
preexisting contractual relationship.
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duty to the plaintiffs to properly supervise, inspect, govern, control, and
manage the construction.139 The court found that this was a duty owed by
the defendant to the corporation exclusively, by virtue of his employment
relationship, and by the corporation to the plaintiffs, by virtue of their
contract, but not by the defendant to the plaintiffs.140 Conversely, had the
plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Handy had negligently damaged their property,
the
court
found
that
they
would
have
stated a cause of action.141 However, the court concluded that the
allegations of negligent supervision were “of a different nature completely”
and did not establish the breach of a personal duty owed to the plaintiffs.142
In light of the factors discussed above and in view of supporting case
law, it becomes apparent that there are good reasons to treat supervision
and management as internal duties, which the directors and officers owe
exclusively to the corporation. As a result, courts should not allow nonshareholder third parties to bring claims based on supervision and
management, turning these duties into external duties by using tort law.
Directors and officers fulfill supervisory and managerial duties,143 but they
do so within the confines of the corporate framework144 and arguably based
on the understanding that their duties in this respect only exist vis-à-vis the
corporation and its shareholders, not third parties.145 Therefore, extending
the duties to supervise and manage the corporation to outsiders represents a
troubling and unwarranted augmentation of directors’ and officers’ overall
duties.
Courts that apply the rule that corporate agents are not personally liable
to third persons for negligence amounting merely to a breach of a duty they
owe to the corporation alone are using a prudent approach.146 However,
one important reservation remains regarding the practice of certain courts
that use a duty-based approach. It should not matter whether there was an
139. Donnelly, 405 So. 2d at 481–82.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 481.
142. Id. at 481–82.
143. See Steele v. Eaton, 285 A.2d 749, 752 (Vt. 1971) (holding that the director is only
liable if he directly participated in the action or omission which caused injury).
144. In addition, corporate law provides directors and officers with considerable
protections from personal liability, whereas ordinary tort law does not provide such
protections. See infra Part III.B.
145. As an exception, directors of an insolvent corporation may owe fiduciary duties to
company creditors. See North Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla,
930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007) (creditors of an insolvent corporation can maintain derivative
claims against directors for breaches of fiduciary duties); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado
About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L.
335, 347 (2006).
146. See, e.g., Donnelly, 415 So. 2d at 480 (discussing Louisiana’s preference for the
“duty analysis” in determining officers’ liability to third parties); Garrity v. Manning, 671
A.2d 808, 811 (Vt. 1996) (discussing the duty-based approach in the context of worker’s
compensation and the duty to provide a safe workplace).
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act or an omission.147 Modern courts have rightly rejected the ancient
distinction between misfeasance, nonfeasance, and sometimes
malfeasance.148 The duty to supervise or manage remains an internal duty,
whether it consists of omissions (such as not having prevented tortious
conduct) or positive acts (such as taking a decision which leads to harm to
a third party). This approach is preferable because there is no obvious
reason to treat omissions differently than actions.
2.

The corporation as exclusive bearer of duties

Let us assume, as suggested in the preceding section, that supervision
and management are purely internal duties, a breach of which cannot lead
to a director or officer’s personal liability. Does this mean that a third
party, injured by inadequate supervision or management by directors or
officers, does not have any recourse? No. Instead, the injured third party
would have to seek recourse against the corporation instead of directors or
officers because the corporation alone bears external duties to supervise
and manage.
Of course, as we have already seen, courts do not broadly accept the
view that only the corporation itself owes a duty to third parties to avoid
harm related to inadequate supervision or management. In fact, the
disaccord is deeper and touches upon the fundamental question of how the
law attributes tort liability to corporations and other legal entities. In short,
the issue in the context of corporate torts is whether: (1) a corporation’s
liability can only be triggered by a corporate agent’s own tortious conduct
(exposing the agent to potential individual liability); or (2) whether the
corporation can be liable despite the absence of any individual corporate
actors’ tortious conduct, i.e. solely by virtue of the breach of a duty borne
exclusively by the corporation.
There is still a widespread conception that since a corporation can only
act through someone acting on its behalf, there must always be an
individual who can be made responsible (and held liable together with the
corporation) for torts in the corporate context. Fletcher’s Cyclopedia of the
Law of Private Corporations expresses this sentiment as follows: “I have
been injured by a wrong done by the corporation; the corporation can act
only by officers or agents and hence I should be entitled to recover from
the officers or agents who are the wrongdoers.”149 Along these lines, courts
often stress that the only way in which a corporation can act is through the
147. See supra note 100 (Providing examples of cases that rely on the rule of nonliability for nonfeasance).
148. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
149. 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1134 (2008).
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individuals who act on its behalf and, in turn, conclude that a person
injured by a wrong done by the corporation will necessarily be entitled to
recover from directors, officers, or other corporate agents linked to the
misconduct.150
However, this view ignores the basic premise of the corporation as a
separate entity and is contrary to important developments in the law of
torts. There are two distinct means by which the law can attribute tort
liability to a corporation: directly or vicariously. In the case of vicarious
liability, the corporation is simply liable for its agent’s wrongful conduct.
Conversely, pursuant to the correct interpretation, holding the corporation
directly liable does not require that there must always be an individual
liable along with the corporation.
Courts have solved the problem of how to hold a corporation directly
liable, independent from tortious conduct by its agents, with the advent of
“depersonalized” enterprise liability.151 For example, in the early landmark
150. See, e.g., Garrity, 671 A.2d at 811 (noting that in the context of an employee’s tort
claim against his supervisor “[a] corporation must act through people . . . . In all cases, an
injured worker can identify a person who is responsible to the corporation for discharging
the particular responsibility the worker claims was breached and sue that person rather than
the corporation.”).
151. In contrast to U.S. law, some civil law countries today still grapple with the concept
of the corporation as a separate bearer of liability. See generally Yedidia Z. Stern,
Corporate Criminal Personal Liability: Who is The Corporation?, 13 J. CORP. L. 125, 126
n.4 (1987). For example, under both German and Swiss law, a corporation can only be
liable for another’s tortious acts. Corporate liability comes either in the form of (1)
vicarious liability, or (2) direct liability. Vicarious liability typically occurs in cases of
tortious conduct by lower-level employees. See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil
Code] Aug. 18, 1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 195, as amended, § 831 (Ger.);
Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht [OR][Code of Obligations] Mar. 30, 1911, SR 220, art.
55 (Switz.). Direct liability, however, is still imputed through tortious conduct by
“managing agents”—such as directors and executive officers—and then treated as the
corporation’s own conduct. See Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18,
1896, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 195, as amended, § 31 (Ger.); Schweizerisches
Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB][Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 55, ¶ 2 (Switz.).
Importantly, in both cases, the individual whose conduct is imputed to the corporation
remains
liable
along
with
the
corporation,
and
a third party can hold both jointly and severally liable. See Gert Brüggemeier,
Unternehmenshaftung – Enterprise Liability: Eine europäische Perspektive? [Enterprise
Liability: A European Perspective?], Haftung und Versicherung 165–66 (2004) (Switz.)
(German law); Vito Roberto & Martin Petrin, Organisationsverschulden aus zivilrechtlicher
Sicht [Civil Liability for 3egligent Corporate Organisation], in VERANTWORTLICHKEIT IM
UNTERNEHMEN: ZIVIL- UND STRAFRECHTLICHE PERSPEKTIVEN [CORPORATE LIABILITY –
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW PERSPECTIVES] 74 (M.A. Niggli & M. Amstutz, eds., 2007)
(Swiss law). Thus, both jurisdictions have not found it possible to hold a corporation (or
other legal entity) directly liable without, at least as a theoretical matter, finding the
commission of a separate tort by a corporate agent. In contrast, under U.S. tort law, the
distinction between lower-level employees and managing agents of a corporation appears to
be of relevance in the context of establishing a specific state of mind of a corporate
defendant. For example, under California law, one requisite that must be met before a
plaintiff may recover exemplary damages from a corporate employer is that the necessary
state of mind must be present on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the
corporation. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(b) (West 2009); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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products liability decision MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,152 Justice
Cardozo made the car manufacturer’s individual actors disappear behind
the corporate shield, treating the corporation as the sole bearer of the duty
of care to the third party plaintiff.153 Of course, this development is even
more remarkable in light of the early rule that corporations could not be
liable for torts, directly or vicariously.154
The holding in MacPherson does not suggest that we should treat
liability for supervision and management according to products liability
principles. Although, where failures to supervise or manage are the result
of a collective process, in which plaintiffs cannot identify one or more
individuals as the wrongdoers, this could be a feasible approach. Rather,
MacPherson suggests that the law recognizes that the corporation may be
directly and exclusively liable, without a director, officer, or other agent
being liable at the same time.155

OF TORTS

§ 909 (1979). Nevertheless, at least in the case of punitive damages awards, there
is not necessarily a requirement that the evidence establish a particular committee or officer
of the corporation acted with the necessary state of mind. See Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122
Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 157, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2072 (2003),
remanded
to
6
Cal.
Rptr.
3d
793
(2003);
see also Ted C. Craig & Christopher N. Johnson, When is a Manager a Managing Agent?,
75 FLA. B.J. 62 (2001) (discussing corporate liability for punitive damages under Florida
law).
152. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
153. See id. at 1055. (“[T]he defendant was not absolved from a duty of inspection . . . .
[Buick Motor Co.] was a manufacturer of automobiles. It was responsible for the finished
product.”). While McPherson was still based on liability for negligence, the Supreme Court
of California introduced in 1963 the rule of strict products liability. See Greenman v. Yuba
Power
Prods.,
Inc.,
377
P.2d
897,
900
(Cal.
1963)
(en banc). Subsequently, products liability law developed even further, making it possible
that, under certain circumstances, liability could not only be shown independent of corporate
agents’ conduct, but also without proof that the defendant producer, manufacturer, or seller
itself was responsible for a defective product. Thus, under the theory of market share
liability, an injured person may hold a defendant liable for damages in proportion to its
share of the total market for the product. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470
(Cal. 1988).
154. See, e.g., Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 608 (1887) (“it is now
perfectly well settled, contrary to the ancient authorities, that a corporation is liable civiliter
for all torts committed by its servants or agents by authority of the corporation, express or
implied.”). See also THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 136–41 (2d ed. 1888) (discussing
abandonment of the rule that corporations cannot be liable in tort).
155. This principle is often overlooked by courts. See, e.g., Sarvis v. Boston Safe
Deposit and Trust Co., 711 N.E.2d 911, 920 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (opining that a
corporation’s liability is “necessarily vicarious”). Many other courts, of course, do
recognize the possibility of a corporation’s direct liability. Common examples are a
corporation’s liability for failure to adequately supervise or train its employees. See, e.g.,
Far W. Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 760 P.2d 399, 402 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (supervision); De
Vera v. Long Beach Pub. Transp. Co., 225 Cal. Rptr.789, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(training). A corporation may also be directly liable for its negligence in instructing,
selecting, and controlling an independent contractor under sections 410, 411, and 414 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. See, e.g., Gass v. V.I. Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir.
2002); Hinger v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 902 P.2d 1033, 1046 (N.M. Ct. App.
1995).
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In other words, agency principles and vicarious liability are not the only
doctrinal basis through which courts can attribute the actions of directors
and officers to the corporation.156 Instead, a corporation can be directly
liable for its own conduct and the breach of duties that it exclusively owes
to third parties. To be sure, even in these cases, one or more individuals
acting for the corporation will carry out the acts that constitute a breach of
duties of care. These acts, however, will be “added” to the corporation’s
duty, resulting together in the corporation’s sole liability.
Thus, while a corporation may well be a “creature of legal fiction,”157 it
is not a precise statement of the law to hold that corporations are “incapable
of tortious conduct” by themselves and that they may only be liable for the
acts of their agents.158 The law has proven to be amenable to treating the
corporation as more than just the sum of its individual parts, i.e. its agents,
but as an aggregate of its individual agents’ acts and their knowledge.159
As such, the corporation is capable of having its own state of mind, bearing
its own duties and being held liable in the absence of an independent tort
by an agent. In short, the corporation does, indeed, have a separate
personality.160
Consequently, in instances where only the corporation owes duties to the
public at large, but not the directors and officers individually, it is
appropriate to limit third party liability to the corporation alone. This is
precisely the situation courts face when confronted with claims against
directors and officers for failures in supervision and management. In these
instances, courts should not look past the corporate shield and should
refrain from imposing liability on directors and officers.

156. Nevertheless, many legal systems, including the United States, believe that
corporate liability can only be understood through the law of agency. See Stern, supra note
151, at 126 (noting, inter alia, that the limitation on corporate rights and duties to fit into the
substance and rationale of agency law has led to inadequate solutions to the problem of
corporate liability for torts).
157. Lokay v. Lehigh Valley Coop. Farmers, 492 A.2d 405, 408 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
158. Id. at 409.
159. See, e.g., Gutter v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, 124 F. Supp.2d 1291, 1309 (S.D. Fla.
2000) (en banc) (explaining that the knowledge necessary to adversely affect the corporation
need not be possessed by a single corporate agent and that the cumulative knowledge of
several agents can be imputed to the corporation). See also Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122
Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2072 (2003), remanded
to 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“It is difficult to imagine how corporate malice
could be shown in the case of a large corporation except by piecing together knowledge and
acts of the corporation’s multitude of managing agents.”).
160. See Stern, supra note 151, at 125 (explaining that because a collective body may
have a legal personality distinct from its individual members and be the independent subject
of legal rights and duties, “the corporation has been able to replace the individual as the
principal actor in modern commercial life”).

PETRIN_OFF_TO_PRINTER_CORREX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/3/2010 10:45 AM

2010]THE CURIOUS CASE OF DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY 1691
B. Failure to Align Corporate Law and Tort Law Liability Standards
Corporate law and tort law differ in many ways, most notably in defining
liability standards for third party claims. These differences become most
apparent when examining the general defenses and protections that
corporate law offers that are not similarly offered under tort law. For
instance, in Delaware, the business judgment rule broadly protects
directors161 and officers162 against liability for business decisions. Even if
the business judgment rule does not apply, the applicable standard of care
is not simple negligence, but gross negligence.163 Moreover, Caremark
allegations of internal control failures can only be successful if plaintiffs
can show a conscious abdication of the respective duties.164 Additionally,
directors’ liability for shareholders’ duty of care claims can be limited or
wholly excluded by virtue of exculpatory charter provisions.165
In contrast, none of these corporate law protections apply to tort claims
brought by third party plaintiffs. Tort-based suits for supervision and
management ordinarily operate under a simple negligence standard,166 or,
in the case of certain strict liability statutory provisions, do not even require
any wrongdoing at all. Neither the business judgment rule167 nor—at least
161. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“[D]irectors’
decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence
relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to
a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that
includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.”); see also Stephen
M. Bainbrige, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83,
88 (2004).
162. See In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 47 n.38 (Del. 2006)
(en banc) (noting that directors and officers are subject to the same fiduciary duties and
standards of substantive review). See also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del.
2009) (en banc) (clarifying that the fiduciary duties of officers of Delaware corporations are
the same as those of directors).
163. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000) (“Director liability for
breaching the duty of care ‘is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.’”).
164. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) aff’g, No. Civ. A. 1570-N,
2006 WL 302558 (Del. Ch. 2006) (en banc) (explaining that plaintiffs must demonstrate a
director’s conscious disregard for his duties as a precondition of oversight liability).
165. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2007).
166. A minority of courts depart from a simple negligence standard in cases involving
directors and officers. See Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d
385, 393–94 (N.C. 1988) (holding that a director must be grossly negligent in order to be
held personally liable for failure to adequately supervise a subordinate); Preston-Thomas
Const., Inc. v. Central Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973) (“The law
will not permit an officer or director to escape personal responsibility for his corporation’s
intentional malfeasance by preserving a state of ignorance through a gross or willful neglect
of duties.”); Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Leccony Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 S.E.2d 51, 53–54 (W.
Va. 1941) (holding that in the absence of an active intent to deceive or defraud creditors, the
officers and directors will not be liable for simple nonfeasance of duty to the corporation or
fraud in its management or mismanagement in the disposition of money or property); Webb
v. Cash, 250 P. 1, 6 (Wyo. 1926) (holding that state bank directors’ failure to know of
condition of bank could not make them liable for resulting loss in absence of deliberate or
reckless conduct).
167. See Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 723 P.2d 573, 582 (Cal. 1986)

PETRIN_OFF_TO_PRINTER_CORREX (DO NOT DELETE)

1692

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/3/2010 10:45 AM

[Vol. 59:1661

in
case
of
direct claims—exculpatory charter provisions168 apply against nonshareholders.
For example under corporate law, absent conscious misconduct,
shareholders could not hold board members and officers liable for their
failure to detect and prevent employees’ torts.169 Similarly, shareholders
would most likely not be able to hold directors and officers liable for
alleged mismanagement under corporate laws, since they would probably
not be able to overcome the business judgment rule,170 or, because directors
may be exculpated from liability for duty of care breaches by virtue of
specific provisions in corporate charters.171 Conversely, in both cases, nonshareholder tort claimants could be successful in a suit against director and
officer defendants by demonstrating simple negligence on the part of the
defendants.
The unwarranted dichotomy of corporate and tort liability standards has
gone mostly unnoticed. A rare exception is Justice Mosk. In a dissenting
opinion to a California Supreme Court decision,172 he argued that courts
should hold directors faced with third-party tort claims to the statutory
liability standard that governs their internal duties to the corporation, but
not to the common law standard.173 As Justice Mosk explained, every act
or omission by directors necessarily affects both the corporation and third
parties.174 Thus, to hold directors to a higher standard of care insofar as
their acts or omissions affect third parties, and to a lower standard insofar
as they affect the corporation, is in effect to hold them to the higher

(en banc) (rejecting the assertion that the business judgment rule controls a director’s
liability to third persons, as the rule only “applies to parties (particularly shareholders and
creditors) to whom the directors owe a fiduciary obligation”).
168. See Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 794 (Del. Ch.
2004) (“[exculpatory clauses] only restrict third parties to the extent that they seek to
enforce rights on behalf of the corporation itself [whereas] . . . [a]ny claims that creditors
possess[] themselves against the firm or its directors—such as claims for breach of contract
or for common law or statutory torts . . . [are] not barred by the exculpatory charter
provision because those claims do not belong to the corporation or its stockholders.”).
169. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (en banc) (holding that imposition of
oversight liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging
their fiduciary obligations), aff’g, No. Civ. A. 1570-N, 2006 WL 302558, at *1–2 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 26, 2006)
170. See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(holding that a derivative claim of corporate losses allegedly sustained by reason of
mismanagement not resulting from directly conflicting financial interests or improper
motivation is barred by the business judgment rule).
171. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
172. Frances T., 723 P.2d 573, 591 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 592–99.
174. Id. at 598.
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standard.175 This is because directors will not be free from liability unless
they adhere to the higher standard.176
In sum, tort-based claims have the ability to undermine the liability
protections provided by corporate laws, creating a state of legal uncertainty
for directors and officers in the process. Ultimately, the threat of potential
tort liability for acts or decisions that would pass muster under corporate
law may undercut directors’ and officers’ decision-making authority.177 As
a result, courts should attempt to mitigate the awkward misalignment of
corporate and tort law liability standards. Directors and officers, when
faced with tort claims, should not be subject to the ordinary simple
negligence standard used in general tort law. Rather, courts should
measure their liability according to a different, lower liability standard.178
C. The 3eglect of the Corporate Shield
Directors’ and officers’ personal liability for torts committed in their
official capacities raises another important concern. Allowing plaintiffs to
hold directors and officers personally and fully liable for supervision and
management related torts creates a tension in relation to two defining
corporate law principles. The first is the principle of a corporation’s
separate legal personality, which entails that the law recognizes the
corporation as an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders,
directors, officers, and other persons who are acting for it.179 The second is
the principle of limited liability, which restricts shareholders’ personal
liability for the debts and liabilities of the corporation to the extent of their

175. Id.
176. Id. Justice Mosk’s dissenting opinion does not refer to the business judgment rule
and its potential applicability in relation to non-shareholders. Nevertheless, the majority of
justices assumed that Justice Mosk in his dissenting opinion also advocated that directors
should be insulated against third party claims by the business judgment rule. See id. at 583
n.15 (characterizing the business judgment rule as a standard of care for corporate directors,
not as a judicial abstention doctrine).
177. In corporate law literature, the problem of striking a balance between a board’s
authority and its accountability to shareholders has been described as a central aspect of
corporate law. The issue also lies at the heart of Professor Bainbridge’s director primacy
theory. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003).
178. See infra Part IV.
179. See, e.g., Walker v. Anderson, 232 S.W.3d 899, 918 (Tex. App. 2007); STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 25–30 (2008)
(discussing the concept of the corporation as person and other models of the corporation).
See also Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A 3ew Analytical Approach to a
Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61,
64–90 (2005) (examining the historic use of various corporate metaphors and tracing the
development of corporate theory); Michael J. Philips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory
of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1061, 1063 (1994) (sketching various
conceptions of the corporation, concluding that a real entity theory of the corporation is
more plausible than its competitors).
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investment180 and insulates corporate agents from contractual claims.181
Together, these principles constitute what I will call the “corporate shield.”
Imposing personal liability on directors and officers for acts undertaken
in their corporate capacity, however, undermines both of these principles.
The current approach of holding directors and officers liable in tort under
general common law principles or statutory provisions therefore begs the
question of how it can be reconciled with the notion of the corporate shield.
1.

The corporation as a separate legal personality
One way of viewing the idea of a corporation’s separate legal personality
is to treat persons acting on behalf of the corporation as an embodiment of
the corporation itself, disregarding these persons’ individual personality.
Thus, only the corporation, not its directors, officers, and other agents—
who have acted only as the corporation’s “arms and legs”—should be liable
for harm to third parties caused while carrying out their corporate duties.
The theory of “alter ego” expresses this sentiment. Under the theory,
which has traditionally served as a way of justifying vicarious liability, the

180. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (2002). Limited shareholder liability remains
a bedrock corporate law principle, even though it has sometimes been contested. See, e.g.,
Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106
HARV. L. REV. 387, 391 (1992) (characterizing limited liability as a threat to the animating
principles of tort law); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 (1991) (arguing that,
for involuntary creditors, limited liability prevents tort law’s cost allocating function and
advocating pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts); David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability,
Tort
Victims,
and
Creditors,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1568–69 (1991) (concluding that the case for limited liability has
been overestimated and that limited liability may be more justified in closely held firms);
Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1271 (2002) (advocating a regime of vicarious liability for
corporate torts for shareholders with the capacity to control corporate activity); see also
Mark I. Weinstein, Don’t Buy Shares Without It: Limited Liability Comes to American
Express, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (2008) (examining the effects of adopting limited liability
on the value of American Express shares, finding little effect on the firm’s value). For a
comprehensive overview of various aspects of limited liability, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001) (analyzing limited liability and its
justifications); Daniel R. Kahan, Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts: A Historical
Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1088 (2009) (stating the definition and function of limited
liability); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious
Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1994)
(expanding on how limited liability affects various corporate actors).
181. Directors and officers normally enjoy immunity from contractual claims, if they
were acting in good faith and did not commit independent torts. See In re JWP Inc. Sec.
Litig, 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 22, §
6.07[2]. The immunity from contractual claims follows the general rule that an agent who
on behalf of his principal enters into a contract with another is not liable under that contract.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (1958). Note, however, that a contractual
obligation may create duties the breach of which will support a tort action. See Michaelis v.
Benavides, 61 Cal. App. 4th 681, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Fryar v. Westside Habilitation
Center,
Inc.,
479
So.
2d
883,
890
(La. 1985); Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973) (allowing tort law recovery
against a corporate officer or agent in connection with his corporation’s breach of contract).
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agent is the “alter ego” of his principal. Therefore, the principal should be
responsible for any losses caused while the agent was acting on his
behalf.182
Greenauer v. Sheridan-Brennan Realty Co.,183 an older New York case,
illustrates the alter ego approach.184 In that case, a corporation was held
liable for the death of a third party, caused by an accident on the
corporation’s premises.185 However, the managing officer of the corporate
owner who was in charge of repairs, upkeep, and general management of
the property, was not held personally liable.186 The court explained that the
officer “acted only for the corporation” and that “his acts were [the
corporation’s] acts, and not his own; as an individual he had no authority
whatever . . . . In that sense only was he its agent.”187 Similarly, there are
other cases that deviate from the general rule and stand for the proposition
that corporate officers and other agents are not personally liable where they
have not acted outside their corporate capacity.188
Building upon these ideas a director or officer acting for the corporation
should be treated as the embodiment of the corporation itself, making only
the latter liable for any misconduct. An alter ego approach can also be
useful in cases where the misconduct originates from one or more
individually identifiable actors.189

182. See, e.g., JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 409–10 (9th ed. 1998) (clarifying
the ideological underpinnings of the employer’s vicarious liability as requiring that “a
person who employs others to advance his own economic interest should in fairness be
placed under a corresponding liability for losses incurred in the course of the enterprise”).
183. 229 N.Y.S. 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 721.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 722. Similarly, under UK law, the “organic theory” treats directors and
officers as the embodiment of the corporation itself. Thus, the company and the individuals
acting for it merge into a single legal entity, and the individual’s acts are disattributed from
the individual and attributed to the company. See Ross Grantham, Attributing Responsibility
to Corporate Entities: A Doctrinal Approach, 19 COMPANIES & SEC. L.J. 168. The organic
approach distinguishes between acts of “organs” that are attributed to the corporation and
acts of mere agents or subordinate corporate employees, which are not attributed to the
corporation. See Stern, supra note 151, at 129; see also Yedidia Z. Stern, Corporate
Liability for Unauthorized Contracts–Unification of the Rules of Corporate Representation,
9 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 649 (1987).
188. See, e.g., Cantwell v. City of Boise, 191 P.3d 205, 216 (Idaho 2008) (“The actions
of an agent are the actions of the corporation. An agent is only liable for actions which are
outside
its
scope
of
duty
to
the
corporation.”);
Rodriguez
v.
1414–22 Ogden Ave. Realty Corp., 304 A.D.2d 400, 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); supra note
19.
189. In contrast, an aggregate view of the corporation—or products liability-inspired
approach—would arguably be less helpful in those instances. See supra Part III.A.2.
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2.

Limited liability for directors and officers?
Corporations are formed with the intent “to protect individual
shareholders, directors, and officers from [personal] liability.”190 As
Professors Hansmann and Kraakman have shown, the essential role of a
legal entity is to provide for “asset partitioning,” which includes the
corporation’s limited liability feature.191 Today’s rules, however, which
allow directors and officers to be held fully liable for supervision,
management, and other conduct deemed tortious, deeply compromise the
notion of the corporation as a device to limit personal liability. Contrary to
the idea of “asset partitioning,” directors’ and officers’ personal liability
allows tort creditors to go beyond the “designated pool of assets that are
available to satisfy claims by the firm’s creditors.”192
This is particularly true in cases where plaintiffs claim that the director
or officer defendant “should have known” of tortious conduct by
subordinates,193 or where statutory liability is based solely on a defendant’s
controlling position within a corporation.194 Both are reminiscent of
unwarranted vicarious liability for the conduct of others and create de facto
nondelegable duties for directors and officers. Specifically, use of the
responsible corporate officer doctrine is a departure from the usual
protections provided by the law surrounding directors’ and officers’ tortbased liability and represents a considerable augmentation of directors’ and
officers’ liability risks.195
190. See, e.g., Fine-Cut Diamonds Corp. v. Shetrit, No. 1283/06 2009 WL 264122, at *3
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). “Organizing a corporation to avoid personal liability is legitimate.
Indeed, it is one of the primary advantages of doing business in the corporate form.”
Hanewald v. Bryan’s Inc., 429 N.W.2d 414, 415 (N.D. 1988).
191. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000); see also Henry Hansman, et al., Law and the Rise of
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006).
192. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 191, at 392–93 (describing typical attributes of
legal entities).
193. See, e.g., Avery v. Solargizer Int’l, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988) (indicating that a director or officer may be found personally liable for negligently
failing to prevent the tortious conduct of an employee); Preston-Thomas Constr., Inc. v.
Cent. Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Civ. App. 1973) (holding that a director or
officer will be personally liable for tortious conduct if there is either a duty to know or the
means to know, regardless of actual knowledge).
194. See supra Parts I.D and II.B.
195. See Tom McMahon & Katie Moertl, The Erosion of Traditional Corporate Law
Doctrines in Environmental Cases, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 29, 29–31 (1988)
(enumerating specific cases pointing toward an expansion of director and officer liability for
corporate activity); Mendelson, supra note 180, at 1265 (noting that cases under CERCLA
have been perceived to be eroding limited liability and other traditional corporate law
concepts); but cf. Lynda J. Oswald & Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the “Erosion” of
Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 259, 329–30 (1992) (concluding
that contrary to fears expressed by many commentators, courts have not dismissed general
principles
of
corporate
law
doctrine
in
deciding cases against corporate actors for CERCLA violations). In addition, one
commentator has pointed out that liability under the responsible corporate officer doctrine
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The fundamental issue is whether the principle of limited liability can be
extended to directors and officers in a manner that would protect them from
tort claims as long as they acted within their scope of employment. In its
current form, limited liability does not preclude directors’ and officers’
personal liability for their torts and tort-like statutory violations.196 Today,
at least in this respect, tort law trumps corporate law as well as the notions
of the corporation’s separate personality and limited liability. Thus, for
directors and officers, protection under the corporate shield is limited to
contractual claims.197 Why does the law allow for this distinction?
Courts and commentators sometimes explain the narrow protections
provided to directors and officers by distinguishing between voluntary
contractual creditors and involuntary tort creditors. Arguably, involuntary
tort creditors deserve the right to seek recovery from both the corporation
and the individual (but not from the shareholders, who are normally
protected even against claims by involuntary creditors),198 because a tort
case forces the debtor creditor relationship upon the creditor and there is no
element of choice involved.199 In justifying the doctrine of a corporate
may not be covered by typical D&O liability insurance policies. See Kevin LaCroix, The
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, D&O DIARY, Jan. 19, 2009,
http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/01/articles/environmental-liability/the-responsiblecorporate-officer-doctrine.
196. See, e.g., Frances T. v. Vill. Green Owners Ass’n, 723 P.2d 573, 582–83 (Cal.
1986) (en banc) (noting that the corporate fiction was “never intended to insulate officers
from liability for their own tortious conduct”); Thompson, supra note 180,
at 7.
197. See Thompson, supra note 180, at 7. One possible, but narrow, exception to the
principle that the corporate shield insulates corporate actors only from contractual claims
may be provided by the judicially created fiduciary shield doctrine. The doctrine, if applied
by courts, precludes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate agents
or employees who are acting in the forum state in their role as corporate agents or
employees. See, e.g., Giusto v. Ashland Chem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 587, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(mem.). Other courts, however, refuse to recognize the doctrine and subject the corporate
official to suits for tortious conduct committed in his corporate capacity. See, e.g., Kreutter
v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 46 (N.Y. 1988).
198. See Thompson, supra note 180, at 12–17. Note, however, that shareholders are not
shielded from personal liability for their own tortious acts. See, e.g., Smith v. Isaacs, 777
S.W.2d 912, 913–14 (Ky. 1989) (noting that a corporate agent is liable for the damage
caused by his own personal acts). Specifically, a shareholder may also be held personally
liable for negligent acts in managing and supervising the employees of its corporation, if
those acts are a contributing factor in causing an injury. See id.
at 914.
199. See Ross Grantham, The Limited Liability Of Company Directors 27–28 (University
of Queensland, TC Beirne School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research
Paper
No.
07-03,
2007),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=991248;
see also Axtmann v. Chillemi, 740 N.W.2d 838, 843–44 (N.D. 2007) (discussing the
distinction in the context of veil piercing). The Supreme Court of California has also used
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors as an explanation for why the
business judgment rule does not apply to non-shareholders. See Frances T. 723 P.2d at
582–83 n.14 (“Of course, a tort victim cares little whether the tortfeasor acted in good faith
to maximize the interests of the enterprise. Unlike shareholders challenging an unprofitable
decision, a tort victim’s exposure to the risk of harm is generally involuntary and

PETRIN_OFF_TO_PRINTER_CORREX (DO NOT DELETE)

1698

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/3/2010 10:45 AM

[Vol. 59:1661

agent’s personal liability for his torts, courts and commentators have also
emphasized their unwillingness to allow the corporate agent to hide behind
the corporate veil, as this would encourage irresponsible behavior and
result in unfair outcomes.200
Moreover, some observers have even advocated for significant increases
in the personal liability of corporate officials.201 In a recent article,
Professor Timothy Glynn suggested a system where the highest-ranking
corporate official is vicariously liable for all torts and tort-like statutory
violations committed within the corporate enterprise.202 Glynn asserts that
the model preserves the beneficial effects of limited shareholder liability
while also reducing the social costs of limited liability by counteracting its
“moral hazard” problem.203 Under the model, in order to escape personal
liability, the highest-ranking “officers will seek to avoid risk and spread the
cost of unavoided risk across firm participants.”204 For example, the riskspreading can consist of: setting appropriate prices for the firm’s goods
and services; monitoring firm activities; maintaining an adequate level of
uncompensated. And unlike the review of business judgments that affect only the pecuniary
interests of investors, courts have a long and distinguished record of deciding whether a
defendant’s personal conduct imposed an unreasonable risk of injury on the plaintiff.”).
200. See, e.g., Grynberg Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338,
1350–51 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (mem.); Frances T., 723 P.2d at 581 (“[A] director could inflict
injuries upon others and then escape liability behind the shield of his or her representative
character, even though the corporation might be insolvent or irresponsible.”); Zipora Cohen,
Directors’ 3egligence Liability to Creditors: A Comparative and Critical View, 26 J. CORP.
L. 351, 361 (2001) (arguing that the imposition of tort liability on directors serves justice
and fairness objectives).
201. See Glynn, supra note 66, at 396–415; Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of
Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 148–49 (1980) (suggesting
that directors of publicly traded corporations should be vicariously liable for
misrepresentations as to the legal and financial status of the company and in cases of claims
by involuntary creditors, as “such a rule would minimize the information costs that owners
would face in monitoring each other’s wealth, would reduce creditors’ transaction costs in
enforcing claims, and would focus incentives to adopt cost-justified avoidance precautions
on that body of persons”); see also Thompson, supra note 180, at 27–28, 40–41 (explaining
that liability for shareholder-managers can be extended if appropriate consideration is given
to possible over-deterrence). Professor Kraakman has also suggested that managerial
liability for debts of the company may be useful in certain contexts, namely in order to
improve compliance. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the
Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). In a later article, however, he and
Professor Hansmann dismiss the idea of holding directors or controlling officers vicariously
liable on efficiency grounds. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 180, at 1928–29.
Hansmann and Kraakman conclude that where insurance is unavailable, “imposing personal
liability for the firm’s entire tort losses on its managers would create a powerful incentive to
overinvest in safety measures or, what is more likely, to resign.” Id. at 1929.
202. Glynn, supra note 66, at 396–415. By “highest-ranking officer,” Glynn refers to a
firm’s highest-named officer (for example the CEO or corporate president) or any other
officer who exercises ultimate executive authority over certain firm activities (for example a
CFO or division head) at the time the tortious activity occurs. See id. at 397. Directors
acting only in their oversight and decision-making capacities and lower-level managers or
employees would not be included in the proposed liability regime. Id.
203. Id. at 398–400.
204. Id. at 400.
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retained capital; having indemnification agreements with the firm or its
shareholders and; obtaining additional compensation and insurance
coverage.205 Thus, Glynn bases his model on the idea that the highestranking officer is an “initial risk bear[er]” who passes on any liability to
other, “ultimate” loss bearers.206
However, in view of the host of problems associated with directors’ and
officers’ personal liability discussed in Part IV, it is difficult to justify
holding directors, officers, or other corporate agents personally liable for
their own tortious acts committed in the scope of employment, let alone
holding them liable for torts committed by other corporate agents. In fact,
a variety of factors all support limitations on personal liability including:
the distinction between internal and external duties, the existence of the
corporation as a separate legal entity, the idea of aligning corporate and tort
law liability standards, the notion of directors and officers as the
corporation’s alter ego, and the need to attribute the risk of doing business
to the corporation.
Returning for the moment to Professor Glynn’s model, it is hard to
legitimize why, as a default rule, a liability regime should force an officer
to risk all of his personal assets and expose him to unlimited liability for
corporate torts.207 As a practical matter, even if the officer is able to spread
the cost for compensating tort victims to the corporation, shareholders, or
an insurer, he can still be a defendant in one or multiple lawsuits against
him personally potentially for years to come, even after having left the
firm. Worse still, under the model, the officer bears the full risk of the
insolvency (or unwillingness to pay) of those who have agreed to
indemnify or insure him.208 Hence, in most cases, it is preferable to
allocate the initial liability risk to the corporation, alleviating the officer of
potentially harsh consequences and leaving it up to internal corporate
mechanisms to prevent or reduce corporate torts and misconduct by
employees.
Moreover, one commentator has recently made a convincing case that
the economic justifications for limited liability for shareholders apply by
analogy with equal force to directors.209 For the most part, scholars think
of limited shareholders’ liability to be economically efficient. By reducing
205. Id. at 401, 404.
206. Id. at 403–04.
207. Glynn admits that high-ranking officers, under his model, may face significant
personal liability. He contends, however, that this residual risk does not render the model
inefficient and points to high-ranking officers’ superior ability to reduce and spread risks.
Id. at 404–05.
208. See JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY § 8:4.1 (2d ed., Release
No. 4, Oct. 2009) (discussing problems in indemnification coverage). See also infra Part
IV.C (discussing the shortcomings of indemnification and D&O insurance).
209. See Grantham, supra note 199.
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the risk for shareholders, the aggregation of capital is facilitated, thereby
encouraging
investments
in
risky,
210
but lucrative ventures. In addition, limited liability reduces shareholders’
need to and costs of monitoring their investment or investment
portfolios.211
By analogy, these reasons also apply to directors and officers. Providing
directors and officers with limited liability facilitates the aggregation of
“human capital” by helping to recruit well-qualified directors and officers.
It also encourages them to invest in riskier, but lucrative projects, and leads
to reduced monitoring costs for shareholders.212 Consequently, limited
liability considerations should apply to directors and officers as well and
should represent an additional element in the analysis of the rules
governing directors’ and officers’ tort liability.213
The case for extending limited liability to directors and officers is, from
an efficiency standpoint, also supported by an economic analysis of
vicarious tort liability. Law and economics theory suggests that in many
cases it is inefficient to attribute tort liability to the agent and that instead
the principal should bear the liability costs arising out of torts committed in
the scope of the agent’s employment.214 Scholars have argued that a
system of exclusive liability for the principal,215 such as a corporation,
210. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 97 (1985) (explaining that “increased availability of funds for
projects with positive net values is the real benefit of limited liability”).
211. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 425 (7th ed. 2007);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 208, at 94–98 (1985). Paul Halpern and his co-authors
find that a limited liability regime is most efficient in cases of large, widely held companies,
whereas they argue that liability should extend to shareholders in closely held companies.
Halpern et al., supra note 201, at 148–49; see also Glynn, supra note 66, at 369–76
(outlining potential social costs of limited liability, casting doubt upon the doctrine’s
efficiency).
212. See Grantham, supra note 199, at 19–22.
213. To be sure, the basic theoretical framework that informs contemporary American
tort law is already concerned with the foreseeable risks and benefits associated with
conduct. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) § 3 cmt. e (discussing the “risk-benefit test” for negligence).
Yet, in the corporate context, these considerations do not necessarily result in the provision
of adequate protections for directors and officers. Moreover, in the case of the breach of
internal duties, see supra Part III.A, the risk-benefit balancing approach should be addressed
at the level of the corporation as the potential tortfeasor, since directors and officers owe no
duty to third parties in such cases and the issue of negligence on their part should not have
to be considered at all.
214. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between
Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (1982) (examining
shifting costs between enterprise, agent, and victim); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984) (exploring the efficiency rationale of
vicarious liability).
215. Even though classic vicarious liability results in joint and several liability of the
principal and the agent, law and economics scholars normally base their analysis on the
assumption that a vicarious liability regime in fact results in the exclusive liability of the
principal. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 15, at 704 (identifying the methodology as
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enhances loss prevention, helps to internalize costs, and facilitates efficient
risk allocation.216
The classic loss-prevention argument is that an agent may not be in a
position to fully compensate a third party for harm caused by his tortious
acts. Thus, an agent will not likely use the optimal amount of care because
he may be under deterred (because his lack of solvency prevents him from
having to compensate the injured party in full) or over deterred (because
his personal wealth may be wiped out in case of a judgment against him.)217
In any case, it is necessary to make the principal liable for the agent’s torts,
in order to induce the principal—who is thought to be able to fully
compensate the tort victims—to make sure the agent uses the amount of
care and preventive measures that are commensurate to the potential
harm.218
Law and economics theory also suggests that, in order to achieve an
optimal volume of production, goods and services have to reflect their true
cost to society.219 Thus, prices of goods and services should also
internalize the liability risks associated with their production.220 However,
cost internalization can only be achieved if the corporation is liable for the
torts of its agents.221 Otherwise, such cost could be externalized.222 Even if
we assume that, in the absence of its own liability, the corporation would
indemnify its agent for any costs incurred by him, the amounts paid would
be lower than the full cost of damages if the agent is not solvent enough to
provide full compensation to the tort victim.223

commonly used by enterprise liability scholars).
216. See infra notes 217–227 and accompanying text.
217. See Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 567
n.9 (1988).
218. Under these circumstances, the investments in loss-prevention will be equal to the
amount of potential damages, which is efficient. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 211, at 188;
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 233 (2004); Jennifer H.
Arlen & Bentley W. Mcleod, Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of Vicarious Liability, in
EXPLORING TORT LAW 111–40 (M. Stuart Madden, ed., 2005) (arguing that the scope of
vicarious liability should be extended); Kornhauser, supra note 214, at 1362; Sykes, supra
note 214, at 1246. The loss-prevention case is probably weaker when we deal with directors
and officers as agents since the corporation arguably cannot exercise the same degree of
control over them as it could in the case of lower-level employees.
219. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1961) (“[T]he most desirable system of loss distribution under
a strict resource-allocation theory is one in which the prices of goods accurately reflect their
full cost to society.”).
220. See id. at 509 (explaining that economic efficiency requires producers of goods or
services to weigh potential liability against potential profit in determining the quantity and
price of goods or services produced).
221. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 172–73 (1987).
222. See id.
223. See Sykes, supra note 217, at 567.
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The principle of loss distribution provides another reason why tort law
should allocate liability only to the principal, but not to the agent.224
Utilitarian and economic theory contend that the corporation, not its agents,
are the most appropriate and efficient bearers of liability risks.225 A
corporation can distribute liability costs more efficiently than an individual
agent can, as it is in a position to distribute the burden among its
shareholders, employees, and customers.226 In addition, the corporation
will be able to insure its liability risks at a cheaper rate than its agents in
their individual capacities.227
In sum, efficiency considerations support the extension of limited
liability to directors’ and officers’ liability for torts. These reasons seem
particularly convincing in the context of their liability for supervision and
management. The potential damages to third parties in this area can
amount to large sums and directors and officers (who may well be wealthy
individuals) represent an attractive target for plaintiffs. A heightened real
or perceived liability exposure, however, adds to an inefficiently high level
of risk aversion on the part of the directors and officers. In case of their
actual liability, the additional, unfortunate effects of unlimited liability
could potentially include a lack of cost internalization on the part of the
corporation and attribution of liability to inefficient risk bearers.
D. Misalignment of Costs and Benefits
Finally, holding directors and officers liable for supervision and
management failures touches upon the problem of the alignment of costs
(or risks) and benefits. Personal liability for acts undertaken in the official
role as director or officer, which consist in great part of supervision and
management, shifts the risk of doing business away from the corporation to
the directors and officers. As a result, an insolvent or otherwise judgment-

224. See P. S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 27 (1967). The
potential benefits of loss-distribution are generally undisputed. In contrast, however,
commentators have expressed doubts as to whether vicarious liability is actually capable of
enhancing internalization of costs and loss-prevention. See id. at 25, 27; Gary T. Schwartz,
The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1756 (1996).
225. For the utilitarian perspective, see ATIYAH, supra note 224, at 22 (arguing that
unlike the majority of the population, employers were well situated to pay for tort damages);
Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456–63 (1923) (contending
that distributing losses that are part of the course of industry is more socially expedient than
passing off the loss to a few); Harold Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J.
105, 112 (1916) (emphasizing vicarious liability as the best social distribution of profit and
loss). For a discussion of loss distribution from an efficiency standpoint, see Fruit v.
Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 141 (Ala. 1972).
226. See Sykes, supra note 214, at 1235–36.
227. ATIYAH, supra note 224, at 25–26.
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proof corporation can potentially externalize some of its liability costs to its
agents.
The problem of cost internalization has, as already discussed, received
considerable attention in the context of law and economics analysis.228
However, the idea of cost benefit alignment has also long been a fixture in
traditional vicarious liability theory where it serves as probably the most
universal justification of why a principal should be liable for the acts of his
agents. Under this approach, the principal bears the risks related to doing
business and by dividing labor by utilizing agents.229 As Judge Friendly
explained in Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States,230 an enterprise
should not only bear the benefit, but also the typical costs flowing from its
activities.231
This idea can be expanded upon by finding that it is the corporation
alone—but not the agent, director or officer who is acting in furtherance of
the corporation’s business—that should bear the liability or risk of doing
business. Under this rationale, the corporation should always bear the full
cost of its business, and costs should not be shifted towards individuals by
making them personally liable for their acts undertaken as agents of the
corporation.
In one narrow area of the law, the idea of curbing the liability exposure
of directors and officers acting for the benefit of their corporations has
already manifested itself. Courts have developed the defense of “economic
justification” to shield directors and officers from claims alleging liability
for tortious interference with another’s contract.232 In the absence of
malice or illegality, the defense immunizes these corporate actors from
claims of tortious interference as long as they act in the interest of or for the
economic benefit of the company.233
Applied to supervision and management claims, courts could employ the
theory of “economic justification” to shield directors and officers from
228. See supra Part III.C.2.
229. See Petro-Tech, Inc. v. W. Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 (3d Cir. 1987)
(explaining the theory of respondeat superior as under section 219 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency by stating that “it would be unjust to permit an employer to gain from
the intelligent cooperation of others without being responsible for the mistakes, the errors of
judgment and the frailties of those working under his direction and for his benefit”); see
also
Gregory
C.
Keating,
The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1266, 1329
(1997).
230. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
231. Id. at 171.
232. See Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 156–57 (N.Y. 1996).
233. Id. at 157–58. See also 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 232 (La.
1989) (recognizing immunity for negligent contractual interference and even intentional
interference when acting for the corporation’s benefit); Wampler v. Palmerton, 439 P.2d
601, 607 (Or. 1968) (declining to extend liability for interference with contract where the
defendants acted to benefit the corporation).
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personal liability. Supervisory and managerial duties are almost always
carried out in the interests of the corporation and any third-party claims
flowing from harm caused by supervisory or managerial acts could be
defended on the grounds of economic justification. Moreover, tortious
interference with contractual claims and claims alleging failures in
supervision and management share some key characteristics. Both
typically involve allegations that certain acts within the corporation led to
the plaintiff’s harm. Both scenarios normally involve purely indirect harm
to the injured party and both include acts representing duties that the actor
owed solely to the corporation. Thus, the parallels between these two sets
of claims suggest that the defense of economic justification may be equally
apt for claims related to supervision and monitoring.
IV. THE EMERGING MODEL
Given that a duty-based inquiry into assessing directors’ and officers’
liability in tort for supervision and management offers a superior approach
than other methods of ascertaining liability, and in light of the problems
associated with holding directors and officers liable for supervision and
management failures, the current approaches to assessing directors’ and
officers’ liability toward third parties should be revised. This Part details a
proposal to reform the current rules for holding directors and officers liable
in tort. In short, the proposed model advocates that directors’ and officers’
tort liability should be limited by distinguishing between internal and
external duties and by using strict requirements with regards to the state of
mind necessary to hold directors and officers liable. Finally, the last
section of this Part will address the model’s potential shortcomings.
A. Liability for Intentional Breaches of Internal Duties
Under the proposed model, directors and officers would not be liable for
breaches of internal duties owed exclusively to the corporation.234 Chief
among these internal duties are the duties that directors and officers owe to
the corporation in the context of supervision and management.235 Thus,
liability for the breach of an internal duty will normally fall only on the

234. This is an approach already adhered to by certain courts. See, e.g., Donnelly v.
Handy, 415 So. 2d 478, 480 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
235. See supra Part III.A.1. In accordance with the modern rule, in defining whether a
duty is internal or external, no distinction should be made between a director’s or officer’s
acts and omissions. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. However, the scope of the
duty
owed
to
the
corporation
can
vary
depending
on whether the defendant is an inside or outside director. See supra note 77. Specifically,
courts should take into account that there can be information asymmetries between inside
and outside directors.
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corporation through its own direct liability, but not on the individuals who
were entrusted with supervisory or management tasks.
Failing to impose liability on directors and officers for breach of internal
duties is justified, in part, by the fundamental tort law principle that
“without duty, there is no liability.”236 Moreover, directors and officers
discharge their supervisory and managerial tasks within the corporate
framework, which offers them considerable protections or even insulates
them from liability. These added protections should be extended to tortbased claims.
The idea of limiting liability for breach of internal duty is also buttressed
by the notion of the corporate shield, which, as explored above, can be
extended to protect directors and officers from tort liability.237 Moreover,
holding directors and officers liable for supervision and management
failures goes against efforts to align the costs and benefits of corporate
activity. Directors and officers act for the benefit of the corporation and its
shareholders. Consequently, the corporation (and, thus, ultimately the
shareholders) should bear the liability risks associated with the conduct of
corporate agents.238
Nonetheless, excluding personal liability for directors and officers for
their breaches of internal duties can raise issues of moral hazard.239
Relieved of personal liability risks, directors and officers may increasingly
engage in misconduct. To mitigate moral hazard problems, directors and
officers should continue to remain liable for the intentional infliction of
harm and fraudulent conduct, even if such harm is the result of the breach
of an internal duty.240 Thus, a third party would still be able to sue
236. Robillard v. Asahi Chem. Indus. Co., 695 A.2d 1087, 1094 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1995).
237. See supra Part III.C.
238. See supra Part III.D.
239. The problem has often been discussed in the context of insurance which can create
“moral hazard” by reducing an insured party’s incentives to avoid risks which are covered
by its insurance. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING
212–19 (1971); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987).
240. Some courts have already expressed the idea of holding directors and officers liable
only for intentional or willful conduct. See, e.g., Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Leccony
Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 S.E.2d 51, 53–54 (W. Va. 1941) (holding that officers and directors
will not be liable for simple nonfeasance of a duty to the corporation or mismanagement in
the absence of an active intent to deceive or defraud creditors); Webb v. Cash, 250 P. 1, 6
(Wyo. 1926) (providing that state bank directors are not liable for failure to know of the
critical condition of their bank in absence of deliberate or reckless conduct). Other courts
have advocated that liability should be contingent on at least a showing of gross negligence.
See Myers & Chapman, Inc. v. Thomas G. Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 385, 393–94 (N.C. 1988)
(arguing that a director must be grossly negligent in order to be held personally liable for
failure to adequately supervise a subordinate); Preston-Thomas Constr., Inc. v. Cent.
Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Okla. Civ. App. 1973) (“The law will not permit an
officer or director to escape personal responsibility for his corporation’s intentional
malfeasance by preserving a state of ignorance through a gross or willful neglect of
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directors and officers where, for example, the latter either consciously
failed to prevent torts by employees or is guilty of intentional acts of
mismanagement. In addition, the corporation, if held liable, will be able to
take recourse against the director or officer, but only insofar as his
conduct—which caused the corporation to incur liability—constituted an
intentional tort.241
This deviation from an effort to limit personal liability is justified
because, apart from moral hazard considerations, directors and officers,
like any other person,242 remain under a duty not to commit intentional
torts. Under obligations imposed by corporate law, directors and officers
are also not relieved from liability for consciously engaging in illegal
conduct or otherwise acting in bad faith.243 Thus, the alignment of
corporate and tort law standards is not disturbed by this exception.
Moreover, intentional misconduct can be easily and inexpensively
prevented by the potential defendants themselves, simply by refraining
from such misconduct.
B. Liability for Grossly 3egligent Breaches of External Duties
In addition to limiting the personal liability of directors and officers for
supervision, management, and other potential breaches of their internal
duties, a number of grounds explored in this Article also support limiting
directors’ and officers’ tort liability for breaches of external duties.
Granted, agency law does not normally provide any protections to an agent
who breaches a duty owed to third parties, despite the fact that he acted for
the benefit of and under the directions of someone else.244 However, the
traditional concepts of alter ego, where a director or officer can be treated
as the embodiment of the corporation, and alignment of costs and benefits,
duties.”). Of course, a persuasive argument can be made that intentional harm will render
any underlying duty into an external duty, i.e., that there is no such thing as an intentional
breach of internal duties.
241. In general, and absent statutory or contractual provisions which hold otherwise,
principals are entitled to be indemnified by their agents to the extent that the principal is
required to pay damages owing to acts within the scope of the agent’s employment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 cmt. d (1958); see, e.g., Wilshire Oil Co. of Tex.
v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277, 1283–84 (10th Cir. 1969) (holding that officers could be liable to
their former corporate employer for expenses and judgments incurred by the corporation if
the expense was a result of their individual wrongdoing).
242. See Blystra v. Fiber Tech Group, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 636, 647 (D.N.J. 2005)
(equating the duty of directors and officers to the duty of every person to avoid committing
intentional torts).
243. See generally Leo E. Strine et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of
Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629 (2010) (examining the role of good faith
in corporate law and, specifically, in the director liability framework).
244. See supra note 17. However, there are cases that stand for the proposition that
directors and officers should not be liable for simple negligence, see supra note 240, or that
a corporate agent cannot be held liable for torts committed in the scope of his employment,
see supra note 19.
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where the corporation is to bear the profits and losses of its business, both
support limiting directors’ and officers’ liability even in
cases of breaches of external duties. Moreover,
economic
analysis
of traditional vicarious liability theory also suggests that—notwithstanding
any distinction between the nature of the duties in question—holding only
the corporation liable, can, in many instances, result in efficiency gains
when compared to a regime of individual liability.245
Taken together, these traditional concepts and economic theory tend to
justify limiting directors’ and officers’ liability even when they owe a
personal duty to the injured party. In addition, while this Article’s focus is
on directors and officers, it also appears that the considerations that support
added protections from personal tort liability could be further extended to
other corporate agents, such as non-managerial employees. These agents,
like directors and officers, are an embodiment of their principal, the
corporation. Thus, in principle, only the corporation should bear the
liability costs arising out of the activities its agents undertake on its behalf.
Indeed, the idea of shielding corporate agents from personal liability for
breaches of external duties is not utopian, as demonstrated by such rules in
certain foreign jurisdictions.246
Nevertheless, this Article will not go so far as to suggest that directors’
and officers’ tort liability for breaches of external duties should be
completely abolished or limited to intentional conduct. The breach of an
external duty is different from the breach of an internal duty and,
accordingly, their treatment should not be equivalent. External duty
breaches normally involve the infliction of direct harm, which results from
the breach of a duty that the defendant personally owed to the injured
party.247 It is therefore not justified to shield directors and officers from
third-party liability for breaches of external duties to the same degree as for
breaches of internal duties. In addition, as already discussed in the context

245. See supra Part III.C.2.
246. For example, under the law of some Scandinavian countries, liability for torts
committed by employees is “channeled” to the principal and plaintiffs can only sue the
latter, but not the employees personally. See Christian von Bar, et al., Vicarious Liability, in
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 431, 436 n.29 (2d ed. 1998) (identifying Denmark,
Finland, and Sweden as countries that follow this model). Also, other countries, such as
France and the Netherlands, have rules in place which shield corporate agents from personal
liability for torts in the absence of at least gross negligence. See, Cass. ass. plén. [highest
court of ordinary jurisdiction], Feb. 25 2000, J.C.P. 2000, II, 10295, rapport Kessous, note
Billiau, D. 2000 (Fr.); BW 6:170 para. 3 (Neth.). In addition, the Dutch Supreme Court has
recently held that a corporate director will only be liable in tort if he made a sufficiently
“serious mistake.” See Bastiaan F. Assink, Secondary Director Liability, THE DEFINING
TENSION,
February 12, 2009, http://www.thedefiningtension.com/2009/02/no7-secondary-directorliability.html.
247. See supra Part III.A.1.
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of internal duties, any liability regime for breaches of external duties has to
factor in possible moral hazard problems.
Consequently, in an effort to balance the need to limit liability for
breaches of external duties against moral hazard considerations and
traditional rules of tort and agency law, courts should apply a lower
liability standard to tort cases involving directors and officers. Hence, the
proposed model suggests that directors and officers should only be liable
for breaches of external duties that involve at least gross negligence.248 In
cases involving only simple negligence by directors and officers, the third
party may still seek recourse against the corporation, whose vicarious
liability for its agents’ negligence would remain unchanged.249 This
approach increases existing protections provided to directors and officers
while, at the same time, preserving strong personal motivations to act
carefully when engaged in actions which may cause direct harm to third
parties.
C. Limitations
The proposed liability model appears to be vulnerable to two main
criticisms. First, restricting directors and officers liability to instances of
intentional conduct (for internal duties) and grossly negligent conduct (for
external duties) may take away important incentives to act in a responsible
manner.250 Second, critics could argue that limiting directors’ and officers’
liability vis-à-vis involuntary tort creditors is inherently unfair as it
diminishes the asset pool available for plaintiffs to recover from and could
result in tort victims remaining uncompensated.
As to the first problem of moral hazard, restricting directors’ and
officers’ liability for torts in the manner as suggested here would arguably
not, by itself, be a reason for encouraging misconduct. Even with a
reduced threat of personal liability, alternative monitoring devices such as
market pressures and non-legal consequences for bad acts may deter
directors and officers. For instance, directors and officers could face loss
of employment, reputational risks, and restrictions on future
employment.251 Furthermore, conduct by agents can be, to some extent,
self-controlled. Behavioral theories suggest that a corporate actor would
248. Admittedly, the distinction between simple and gross negligence (and other degrees
of culpability) remains murky. Nevertheless, using a gross negligence standard is useful in
that it signals that a heightened degree of culpability is necessary to impose liability.
249. In order to preserve the director’s or officer’s increased protection for cases of
external duty breaches, the corporation—if held vicariously liable—could only ask to be
indemnified in cases of gross negligence. See supra note 241.
250. This is the problem of moral hazard. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 179, at 171–73 (discussing directors’ reputational
concerns).
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obey his duties out of his own volition and not only out of fear of incurring
pecuniary liability.252 In addition, directors and officers have incentives not
to pursue activities that could create vicarious tort liability for the
corporation as financial harm to the corporation can negatively impact their
own compensation and ultimately threaten their jobs and livelihood.253
Moreover, shifting the risk of doing business from the corporation to its
directors and officers is not the appropriate solution for ensuring that they
will not engage in wrongdoing.
With regard to the second criticism, a lack of fairness for potential tort
victims, it is admittedly true that limiting individual corporate actors’
liability increases the chances that a third party may remain
uncompensated. If the corporation is insolvent and corporate agents cannot
be the subject of any claims, the tort creditor may not have sufficient
recourse. Of course, considerable sympathy is aroused for anyone injured
by tortious conduct and, from the tort victim’s perspective, limiting
personal liability could be seen as unfair.254 Still, tort victims’ interest in
compensation must be weighed against the factors which speak in favor of
limiting directors’ and officers’ personal liability, and the proposal here
concludes that, under most circumstances, the interests in limiting
directors’ and officers’ liability outweigh the potential unfairness that tort
victims could face.
Finally, critics may point out that directors and officers are already
protected from personal liability for third-party tort claims by
indemnification and insurance and that, therefore, any changes in this area
of the law are moot.255 However, as a practical matter, plaintiffs are most
252. See Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory
and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811,
857–77 (2003) (discussing the application of altruistic theory in corporate governance);
see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social 3orms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253,
1291 (1999) (“In the loyalty area, social norms increase efficiency by supplementing the
roles of liability rules and monitoring and bonding systems.”).
253. See Bainbridge, supra note 180, at 533–34; Glynn, supra note 66, at 381.
254. In general, limited shareholder liability has been described as immoral and as
encouraging an immoral attitude in commercial dealings. See Ben Pettet, Limited Liability–
A Principle for the 21st Century?, in 48 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1995, PART 2:
COLLECTED PAPERS 125, 142–43, 154 (1995).
255. All states have indemnification statutes in place, usually in their corporate laws.
See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:3.1. For example, in suits brought by third parties,
Delaware law allows a corporation to indemnify directors and officers for expenses,
judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement, provided that the director of officer acted
in
good
faith.
See
DEL.
CODE.
ANN.
tit.
8,
§
145(b).
A corporation must indemnify a director or officer who “has been successful on the merits
or otherwise,” without regard to whether the director or officer acted in good faith or not.
See id. § 145(c); Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 1996). In
addition to indemnification pursuant to corporate law statutes, a director or officer may have
additional indemnification rights under the corporation’s charter or bylaws, or under a
contractual agreement with the corporation. See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:3.2.
Moreover, corporations can purchase D&O insurance to protect directors and officers from
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likely to proceed against directors and officers personally when the
corporation is insolvent or bankrupt.256 In these instances, indemnification
agreements
between
directors
and
officers and the corporation can be worthless. Similarly, experience
shows that the protection offered by insurance—if insurance has
been purchased at all—is incomplete. Insurance policies contain numerous
important exclusions,257 D&O insurers may be reluctant to pay or can
become insolvent, and, moreover, the bankruptcy of a corporation can
remove some or all of the insurance protections for directors and
officers.258 In addition, insurance is capped,259 and disputes between
current and former directors (and officers) may lead to disagreement over
the proper allocation and distribution of D&O insurance proceeds.260
Finally, even if directors and officers—for example due to insurance
coverage or indemnification—are not obliged to make payments
themselves, this cannot per se serve as an argument against a change in the
rules governing directors’ and officers’ liability, where such changes are
supported by doctrinal considerations and tend to produce more efficient
overall outcomes.
CONCLUSION
Directors’ and officers’ liability under corporate and securities laws
continues to be a hotly debated subject. Interestingly, however, their
liability toward non-shareholder third parties under common tort law and
statutory provisions has generated relatively modest scholarly interest.
losses arising out of “wrongful acts” for which they are not indemnified (referred to as “Side
A” coverage). See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:4; Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith,
The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability
Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1801–06 (2007).
256. See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:4.4[C]. The stay provision of the Bankruptcy
Code does generally not apply to solvent directors and officers as codefendants of a debtor
corporation. See supra note 6.
257. See Dan A. Bailey, D&O Policy Commentary, in D&O LIABILITY & INSURANCE IN A
SARBANES-OXLEY WORLD 163, 176–85 (2003) (discussing typical D&O policy exclusions).
For example, liability under the responsible corporate officer doctrine is not necessarily
covered by D&O liability insurance. See supra note 195. Two prominent cases, In re
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) and In re Enron
Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 391 F. Supp. 2d 541,
569–70 (S.D. Tex. 2005), very clearly expose some of the weaknesses of D&O insurance.
258. See FANTO, supra note 208, at § 8:4.4[I]; Anthony K. Greene, 3ew Risks for
Directors and Officers, in D&O LIABILITY & INSURANCE IN A SARBANES-OXLEY WORLD
247, 252 (2003) (noting that D&O insurers denied insurance coverage to Enron due to
financial misstatements).
259. See Greene, supra note 258, at 253 (delineating coverage plans and corresponding
policy limits).
260. A recent high-profile example is the dispute over the proceeds of AIG’s primary
D&O insurance policy. See Kevin LaCroix, Interpleader: AIG, Greenberg and D&O
Policy Proceeds, D&O DIARY, May 12, 2009, http://www.dandodiary.com/
2009/05/articles/d-o-insurance/interpleader-aig-greenberg-and-do-policy-proceeds.
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Meanwhile, courts have developed various approaches for imposing on
directors and officers tort liability for supervision, management, and other
conduct. The case law in this area is plentiful and often difficult to
reconcile261 and trends such as liability for “controlling persons” have
increased directors’ and officers’ liability exposure.
This Article has explored different ideas in support of restricting
directors’ and officers’ liability for supervision and management. What has
emerged, in the end, is a proposal for a novel model of corporate liability,
centered around the nature of directors’ and officers’ duties and with a
focus on the individual’s state of mind. Thus, for breaches of internal
duties, including supervision and management, directors and officers
should not incur personal liability, except where they act with the intention
to inflict harm upon third parties. Conversely, directors and officers should
remain liable for breaches of external duties, provided, however, that their
conduct was at least grossly negligent.
Most importantly, at its core, this Article and the proposed model are
based on the belief that modern tort law should not treat individual
corporate actors in the same manner as any other individual. Instead, it
should account for the fact that directors and officers act on behalf of and
for the benefit of the corporation. As a result, to preserve the corporate
shield, liability standards in tort law should not conflate the standards
imposed on individuals with those imposed on directors and officers.

261. This unsatisfying state of matters is reflected in the title of an article by two
California practitioners. See Allen B. Grodsky & B. Alexander Moghaddam, Making It
Personal, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2004, at 24.

